BOOK REVIEW OF
Robert D. Kaplan, Eastward to Tartary, Travels in the Balkans, the Middle-East, and the
Caucasus, (New-York: Vintage Books, 2000), 364 pages.





Abstract
Eastward to Tartary was written in the blood-letting ethnic civil war context in the former Yugoslavia. The book is described as the author's "perspective travelogue" in which Robert D. Kaplan takes the readers for a journey through the Middle-East and the Balkans,and reported two major categories of observations and predictions: the social political, and economical issues in the region.

Keywords: Eastward to Tartary; the Balkans; the Middle-East; the Caucasus; the "Near-East"; "Third World Europe".



















1
In 1993, the World is witnessing the blood-letting in Yugoslavia's ethnic civil war which entered its fifth year. Robert D. Kaplan wrote a compiled history of that tragic region in order to anticipate the problems which loom in that strategic part of the World. He traveled in the region twice in 1998 and 1999. Eastward to Tartary was published in such a troubled historical context of the Balkans, the Middle-East and the Caucasus.
Robert D. Kaplan is a prominent but controversial American journalist. He is presently an editor for The Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New-York Times, The New Republic and The Wall Street Journal. Kaplan has been prolific in recent years, and the recurrent theme he develops is the re-emergence of cultural and historical tensions.
The author takes readers for a journey through the Middle-East and the Balkans throughout the course of his book: Eastward to Tartary, Travels in the Balkans, the Middle-East, and the Caucasus. The book is described as his "perspective travelogue". Kaplan reported on two major categories of observations and predictions:
-The social political issues that include the political instability and conflicts, the extreme militarism and the overwhelming authority of the local governments, the influence of Turkey, the lack of democracy, ethnocentrism and corruption.
- The economic observations and predictions include the extreme poverty, the desperate situation of individuals and many families, the oil production that could change the future of the region. But to what extent are the deficits and impact of Kaplan`s observations and predictions?

As a travel writer, a commentator and a political observer, Robert D. Kaplan outlines both historical and current political significance of the area he visited: the new "Near East". It includes the Balkans and central Asia primarily. The author anticipates the region will be the center of World politics. He explores places such as Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Romania, Bulgaria and the Caucasus, and describes them as well as making determinations about those places.
Kaplan goes to countries and locations, and reveals their essence through his interactions with individuals.
At the time when Eastward to Tartary was published, the evidence of the political unrest in the Balkans are still fresh in our mind with the ongoing conflicts and civil wars so inherent to the
region. The Yugoslav wars were a series of violent conflicts that took place between 1991 and 2001. They comprised two sets of successive wars affecting all the six former Yugoslav Republics. Alternative terms in use include the "war in the Balkans". In reference to Donald L. Horowitz, the common elements of ethnic conflicts in the Balkans and especially in Kosovo are highly focused on relation to the State, relations of people to the land and territory. He continues to explain that the war in Kosovo is linked to the notions of localized priorities, divisions between larger groups, stronger apprehension of external affinity felt by the group that does not share this affinity. Among the last characteristics but not the least, Horowitz underlines the fear of competition and domination, and the ethnically based parties. Parties in conflict are making demands on the State, and are asking for a reconstitution or a reformulation of the State.
On one hand, the right of Kosovo to autonomy granted in 1874 was suppressed by the Serbs in 1989. The Albanian government and Parliament were not recognized. On the other hand, Kosovo is the center of two antagonistic nationalisms. This conflict has also a link with divisions between Muslim and Orthodox religious groups. The Serb minority population has an important affinity with the whole Serbian population of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in particular, the population of Serbia. The Kosovo's Albanians have their own with Albania. When Kaplan talks about tragedy, it is because almost all of the wars in the region were characterized by bitter ethnic conflicts pitting the people within the same country, against each other. Essentially, the author argues that the basic point that history repeats itself, and today`s political conflicts are the same as yesterday`s perhaps presented in a different package. As we have stated above, all those conflicts were nationalistic in character: example of the clash between the Serbian and Croatian ideologies personified by President Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, and President Tudman in Croatia. The Serb-Croat conflict was complicated in Bosnia by the presence of the large Muslim Bosniak population. In Kosovo, Macedonia and central Serbia, the conflicts were caused by racial and political tensions between Slav government and Albanian national minorities which sought for autonomy.
The political misfortune in the region is also characterized by the lack of true Democracy. In Eastward to Tartary, Kaplan tries to determine why Democracy has not taken hold in the areas as expected. One reason is the extreme militarism observed in some countries. In Turkey for example, the author describes how the influence of the military is woven deeply into the fabric of the Turkish democratic society. Still taking about this country, Kaplan adds:
"Turkey is a case point. Here Democracy is proclaimed, but the reality
is more complex […]".
Another reason explaining the lack of Democracy is that the Middle-east with Iran as a notable exception, was under Ottoman rules for centuries, and thus could not spawn viable political institutions. The negative impact of Ottoman rule was not restricted to the Arab World. Turkey itself shed much of the Ottoman legacy. The last reason is that authority is central to Muslim culture. Islam, unlike Christianity and Judaism, has never undergone a reformation that challenged religious authority in a permanent and systematic manner.
Another point of Kaplan's political observation is the growing power and influence of Turkey in the Middle-East and Central Europe. In reference to Mevlut Katik, Turkey is engaged in a major diplomatic push to promote stability in the Caucasus. Ankara's initiatives involve Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Hopes have risen for a breakthrough in the Karabak peace process. On one hand, Turkish leaders appear concerned about Azerbaijan's domestic political situation, and encourage democratization in that country. On the other hand, Turkey is searching for allies. Faced to anti-Muslim in the West, it is looking Israel as a strategic partner. The Turks felt that the Jews could help with the Greek problem. They are pro-Israel because they can use the Jewish lobby in the United States as an arm against the Greek American lobbies which deny them military equipment from America.
Turkish-Israeli strategic alliance is as important as the Sino-Soviet split of the 1970`s, and "it is more than just a fleeting arrangement of diplomatic niceties", the author reported. The role of Turkey is also highlighted with its new "ties on security issues" with Russia. During recent talks between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish political leaders, it was clear that their view totally coincide with regard to the situation in the region as well as to the issues concerning the preservation of stability in the World. Both Moscow and Ankara are closely following the geopolitical changes that are taking place in post-soviet Eurasia. Leaders of both parties have stressed their commitment to the peaceful settlement of the inter-ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus.
Comparatively, the author disregards the Palestinian issue and peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis. He tends to focus more attention on the numerous ethnic issues that face many countries in the region. The recent war in Iran highlighted many of these issues.
Sherri Adeska outlines the difference between Kaplan`s perspective and the current situation and media coverage: efforts in the Balkans and the Middle-East tend to focus on the immediacy of the issue, rather than focusing on the years of past relations that have led to the current crises.
The pessimistic observations on the political situation of the region are the same as far as the socio-economic issues are concerned. Nevertheless, the only difference is the oil production which obviously will change the picture of the region.
The Middle-East and the Balkans are experiencing the effects of the rebellion of the working classes. This is the result of increasing unemployment, increasing poverty and the eroding economic systems of the countries in the area. For example, as Russia completes the first stage of its base withdrawal from Georgia, residents of the city of Ajara are concerned about the economic implications of the departure of Russians troops. Unanswered questions surround the work prospect for Georgians employed as military personnel. Civilian base employees are readying themselves for a stiff drop in pay. The main concern of the Georgians is how to take care of their families. 15% of Ajara`s populations of 40,000 is unemployed, and 59% of the region`s residents live under the poverty line.
Despite the increasing poverty within the families, Kaplan also reported on the Caspian energy potential. Kleveman Lutz confirmed that the region will garner the attention of the World powers in the new Millennium further. According to the US Department of Energy, the Caspian Sea Basin comprising Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, along with parts of Russia and Iran, harbors as much as 270 billion of oil, or about one-fifth of the World`s total proven reserves of petroleum. The Caspian natural gas is estimated at some 665 trillion cubic feet representing one-eighth of the World`s gas reserves.Obviously, this can change the aspect of the region.
In order to realize Kaplan`s impact, it is necessary to re-examine the region he speaks of as it currently exists, and to measure his insights against the current reality.
Eastward to Tartary had a lot influence on Clinton and Bush administrations. In reference to Steven Mufson, President George W. Bush "immersed himself" in Kaplan`s book. The author was even invited to the White House. Kaplan's observations could have launched the US strategic engagement across the entire Transcapian since 1995. Other recent development in the Middle-East and the Balkans are indeed very reminiscent of his observations and predictions. In this way, the author appears to have an enormously lucid grasp on the pulse of
this region. Eastward to Tartary reveals a remarkable understanding of the dynamic of the area, and current events are most often an extension of those dynamics he has observed.
Kaplan presents the failure of Orthodox churches, which were not bulwarks of the democratic opposition to Communism, like the Catholic churches in Poland and Hungary to bring stability. Without the root of belief that the Catholic churches bring these Eastern Christian States have largely stagnated and declined. It is a fascinating little example likely ignored by Western observers. All of this is mostly new information to Americans. Eastward to Tartary performs the valuable lesson of educating Americans about these forces at work in the two regions of the World, that are going to occupy the US attention for the next decade: Central Asia and the Middle-East. Many Americans do not have any sort of notion of the types of ethnic and religious forces that operate in Syria or Romania or Azerbaijan.
The impact of the book is also highlighted on the chapter on Syria and Lebanon. In fact, when the Media starts talking about Syria today, they present the country as a United Muslim State full of tyranny that supports terrorism. In other words, Syria is the equivalent of Iraq. However, Syria is fascinating different, thanks for the multitude ethnic rivalries that exist in the country. It is not certain that some have heard about the "Alawaites", the ethnic group to which the ruling elite and many members of the army`s officer corps belongs. The success and control of the Syrian army is important and well understood by the author.
The development of the city of Beirut in Lebanon is also a vastly under-reported development. A prosperous State like Lebanon with a growing middle class could have huge implications for the Middle-East. Who could have known about these things? The Media does not bother to tell about, but Kaplan does it. Another example of unknown information is Kaplan's sojourn through the Balkans. Little is known about Europe's "Third World", but its importance looms large, as the author shows, because of the imminent admission of Bulgaria and Romania to NATO and the EU.
Although Kaplan is an exceptional writer and political observer, Eastward to Tartary is a little bit disappointing. The book contains very little information on the countries he visited contrary to previous writings. His travels seem to have no clear purpose. Like Fitzrow MacLean's Eastern Approaches, an account of his travels as a British diplomat in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 1930's, Robert D. Kaplan's book can leave the reader uncertain as how true and accurate it is. This is a critical question for military readers since the author enjoys a certain vogue amongst senior officers, from his earlier writings on the Balkans, and on political instabilities that followed the end of the Cold War. Kaplan writes about places where conflict involving the American military seems likely.
A "travelogue" can be truthful without being accurate. Inductive reasoning is correct only if the specific truth of the part is applicable to the whole. Local anecdotes are instructive when balanced or placed in context by the author. Eastward to Tartary fails to pass these tests in too many places. For example, Kaplan contrasts the impact of organized crime on the political and economic development of Bulgaria with that on other Soviet-bloc States, relying on information given in a discussion with Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev.

"Bulgarian crime has no centuries old tradition
Like Italy`s, or even of heroic thieves […] in
Russia, Serbia, or Albania".

Thus the author sweeps away a fine tradition of pre-modern criminality as captured in local poetry and song erasing the figure of the "mountain bandit" ("hayduk") as a central element in Bulgaria's nationalist identity.
The comparison between time's legacy in the southern Balkans and in the Caucasus is also indicative of Kaplan's theoretical inconsistencies. Some events appear rooted in the past of tribal identities and imperial politics while others not. One is never sure when or why Kaplan believes history is relevant. Factual errors also are a distraction for the informed reader. For example, Kaplan claims that in 1996, Islamist Welfare Party leader Necmettin Erbakan formed a "minority government" that was pushed from power by the Turkish military. Erbakan's government was in fact a majority coalition government in partnership with the Center-Right.
Finally, in reference to Michael Hickok, Kaplan misuses words and language in places in an attempt to enhance the authenticity of the observations about the enduring nature of historic patterns. For example, in describing the different neighborhoods of Jerusalem he writes:

"The Old City's various ethnic and religious groups
coexisted thanks to the Ottoman "wilayet" system
of communal self-government, which the Israeli
authorities had only modestly tampered".

Michael R. Hickok adds that "wilayet" in Ottoman "vilayet" means a province or a country, and the word the author was searching for is "millet", which means a religious community or a group defined by religion and language.
In His book, Kaplan himself offers such as a caution when he remarks on the work of Freya Stark, a mid-century travel writer commenting on the same region:

"She was a gifted writer, but a poor political observer […]
This is why I have never been comfortable with her books".

Eastward to Tartary is a fascinating exploration of places of "Third World Europe" (Romania and Bulgaria), Turkey, Syria, Jordan and the confusing conglomeration of countries and people in the Caucasus. The author interprets present-day politics through the lens of "national character" and historic smile. He uses anecdotes to instruct on history, geography and societies.
The accuracy of his observations allows the readers to continue to see the results of the dynamics that he has described in the Middle-East for some time. Both Kaplan and the current political trends confirm the area will continue to be a political and economic interest of the United States and the World for a long time to come.























SELECTED SOURCES

Aerospace Power Journal, 16 May 2001.
Horowitz, (D.L.)," Making Moderation Pay: "The Comparative Politics of Ethnic Conflict
Management" In: Montville, J.V. (Lexington Massachusetts, 1990,
pp. 453-455.
Kaplan, (R.D.), Eastward to Tartary, Travels in the Balkans, the Middle-East, and the
Caucasus, (New-York: Vintage Books, 2000).
"The Military and Democracy in Turkey" In: The Globalist, Friday, March 16, 2001.
"The Turkey-Israel Axis" IN: The Globalist, Friday, march 23, 2001
Kleveman, (L.), "Oil and the New Great Game" In: The Nation, 2/6/2004.
Library Journal, "Critics". Retrieved September 23, 2005 from:
Barnes and Noble-.com-Eastward to Tartary.
Melvut, (K.), "Turkey Promotes Stability in the Caucasus", 7/18/2005.
Mufson, (St.), "The Way Bush Sees the World" In: The Washington Post, 2/17/2002.
Sherri, (A.), "Analysis of Eastward to Tartary", The Paper Store, Inc., 6/2003.
The Middle-East and the Balkans, Report on the Regional Conference", 2003.
Theresa, (F.), "Economic Questions Surround Russian Base Withdrawal in Georgia" In:
Eurasia Insight.
"Thinking Peace".
Torbakov, (I.), "Russia and Turkey Forge New Ties on Security, Trade" In: Eurasia Insight
8/8/2005.
"US Department of Energy Report" quoted by Michael T. Klare In: Thinking Peace.
Zakhein, (D. S.), Speech Delivered Before the National Conference of World Affairs Councils
1/28/2005.











9

BOOK REVIEW

Barnett, (T.P.M.), The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in The Twenty-First Century,
(New-York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 2004), 435 pages.


Abstract

The Pentagon's New Map presents a binary view of the World heavily dependent upon the continued advancement of globalization. Barnett's theory comprises two components; according to the author, the World is divided in two parts: The" Core" or the developed societies, and the "Gap" or the areas that globalization has not reached yet. In the second component of his theory, the author suggests a new model for a "dual military" because of the security challenges that arise in the "Gap".


Keywords: The Core; the Gap; globalization; dual military, Leviathan; connectivity; the System Administrator; disconnectedness.














1
Thomas P.M. Barnett author of The Pentagon's New Map has his origin from the small city of Chilton, and looking back, his parents shaped his view on the World. His father was a city attorney, the position which influenced his growing up years. The father was a sort of local "Leviathan" in terms of enforcing rules. A Harvard graduate in Russian Studies, Barnett became later a strategic analyst at the Pentagon and then on temporary assignment at the Naval War College.
In his book, Barnett builds a binary view of the World heavily dependent upon the continued advancement of globalization. His theory essentially has two components:
First, the argument that the World is divided into two parts: the Core which comprises all the economically functioning places, and the Gap which has all the economically, cultural and political basket cases. The Core includes the traditional great powers and developed societies. The Gap is the areas that globalization has not reached yet. Barnett argues that in those areas of increased global "connectivity" and more widely available weapons of mass destruction, an unstable and disconnected country or government can pose a threat to the United States and its interests. The only way to mitigate this threat is to overtime integrate the Gap countries into the Core.
The second component of his theory suggests a new model of "dual military".The security problems that arise in the Gap require two different kinds of military: "Leviathan" will basically overthrow nasty and rogue regimes,while the "System Administrator" will rebuild the country back up after those regimes have been kicked out.
The first part of the review is the description of Barnett's theory with an analytical approach of the divide between the "Functioning Core" and the "Non-Integrated Gap". This theory is obviously placed upon the praise of globalization and a number of rule sets. It allows us to assert why the concept of "connectivity" is central to the author, and what are the dangers associated with his definition of "disconnectedness", what is the role of the dual military and the" global transaction strategy "as well.
There are many points where one can agree with Barnett and some where one can disagree. For instance, "Connectivity" is vital for the minimization of the threats, but the recommendation that places Africa last on the list of those areas to be "saved" is very simplistic. This evaluation section is the second part of the Review completed by a comparison between the
Pentagon's New Map and Blueprint for Action written by the same author.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Unites States has been trying to come up with an operating theory of the World and a military strategy to accompany it. Policymakers and strategists have been struggling to describe the security environment emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many theories have been suggested by scholars, and the most optimistic and ambitious alternative came from Francis Fukuyama. He argued that the end of the Cold War meant that liberalism had become the dominant force in the World. Samuel Huntington postulated a "clash of civilizations", and Robert D. Kaplan joined the fray arguing that history was much still in evidence.
The Pentagon's New Map combined security, economic, and cultural factors to provide a fundamental reexamination of war and peace in the post-9/11 World, and a compelling vision of the future. The book postulates and examines a new version of national security for the 21st century. Barnett argues that terrorism and globalization have combined to end the great power model of war. Instead, he divides the World along binary lines: an increasingly "Functioning Core" of economically developed, politically stable States integrated into global systems is juxtaposed to a "Non-Integrated Gap", the most likely source of threats to US and international security. Barnett underlines that these regions are dangerous because they are not yet integrated into globalism's "Core", and consequently they are "disconnected" countries. The author's main contention is that those countries which reject globalization or connection via information and economic networks to the rest of the World are a huge source of danger. Such countries are usually run by nasty elite who essentially tyrannizes the populations who are left poor and angry. The disconnected people are ripe to become terrorists, and their nations ripe for the location of terrorist networks. Iraq and Somalia illustrate this point of view.
The divide between the "Functioning Core" and the "Non-Integrating Gap" differs from the gulf between rich and poor in a subtile yet direct way. State governments make conscious decision to become connected vs. disconnected to advancing globalization. States and their leaders can provide the infrastructure and the opening of large global markets to their citizens in ways that individuals cannot. An example can illustrate the point: I can be rich and disconnected in Cameroon or poor and disconnected in North Korea. In each case, the country an individual lives in has decided to be disconnected. Citizens in this case have a limited likehood of remaining rich and unlimited prospects of remaining poor. This distinction is crucial to Barnett because in his view of the security environment, "connectivity" is the key solution of today`s security dilemma.
Barnett then suggests first, the integration of the Gap countries into the Core. The most serious flaw is that the author never proposes a rigorous, quantifiable and testable definition of "connectivity". Nevertheless, it means globalization which is the key to World peace and prosperity. Countries that are integrated into the World economy don't go to war against each other. Standards of life rise to less frustration and less violence internally and towards the World. So the concept of "connectivity" is central to Barnett`s thesis in such a way that it is considered as a moral good with essentially limitless potential for making the World a better place.
The difference between the Core and the Gap is "connectivity". The Core is a "Lockean world" in which law is supreme, and the Gap is a "Hobbesian world" in which the law enforcement maintains order. Barnett points out that the idea of connectivity is central to the success of globalization. Without it, everything else fails. Peter Bakke also reaffirms that connectivity is the "glue "that holds States together and helps prevent war between them. For example, the United States is not likely to start a war with "connected" France, but America could more likely instigate a war with a "disconnected" North Korea, Syria or Iran like it did with Iraq.
Being part of the "Functioning Core", the enlightened State allows all citizens a running start at becoming part of a worldwide economic system, and thus provides prospects for a better future, because global jobs and markets are open to them. An example to illustrate the point: connected economy such as India's enables citizens who once had no prospects for a better life to find well-paying jobs, such as computer-related employment. Prospects for a better Indian life are directly the result of the Indian government's conscious decision to become connected to the World economy which means globalization.
The second alternative to mitigate the threat from the Gap countries ruled by "bad guys" who don't want to play well with others in the global sandbox, Barnett suggests the involvement of military action. This is where the other component of his theory comes in. The author calls for a division of the US Armed Forces into two separate non-governmental entities: one is called the "Leviathan" which basically ejects bad regimes, and the other is called the "System Administrator" whose duty is to build the country back up after the nasty regime has been overthrown. The System should assume responsibility for facilitating the transaction the
"Gap systems" into the Core. Two distinct duties and two distinct forces are implemented. Thinking of the situation in Iraq, one can appreciate how this component of Barnett's theory would have an obvious impact. Indeed, his theories have had an impact in the country. The conviction here is that the United States should use its political, economic and military influence to overthrow repressive regimes in order to eventually integrate them into the globalized marketplace. The reason is that today the threat is defined by "disconnectedness".
But the opponents of this policy would argue that the United States, by using it will become either a global policeman or an imperial power.
After placing his theory of the Core/Gap on preemptive war strategy firmly into the church of globalization (read) connectivity, Barnett next places it upon the alter of "rules sets". Few will argue that the World is an anarchic place, and Barnett tells us that the rule sets are needed to define "good" and "evil" behavior of actors in this chaotic international system. An example of such a rule is the desire of the Core to keep Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) out of the hands of terrorist organizations. Other examples are the promulgation of Human Rights and the need to stop genocide. Unfortunately, the United States, the European Union (UE) have been incapable to stop killings and massacres in Darfur Sudan.
Barnett suggests that the United States now should export a brand new rule set called "preemptive war" (from the Bush administration), which aims to fight actors in the Gap in order to end international terrorism for all time. The author makes it clear that the Core's enemy is neither a religion (Islam) nor a place (Middle-East), but a condition (disconnectedness).
The final basic premise of Barnett's theory of the Core and the Gap is the concept of what he calls the "global transaction strategy" which he explains in these terms:
"America's essential transaction with the outside World is one exporting
security in return for the World's financing a lifestyle.We could far more
readily without all that defense spending".
He claims that America pays the most for global stability, because Americans enjoy it the most. Instead of outlining an argument for an American Empire, Barnett is simply enunciating a more comprehensive successor to the Cold War strategy of containment. In fact The Pentagon's New Map strives to be a practical "strategy for a second American century".The author explains how the Pentagon, still in shock at the rapid dissolution of the once evil empire (read the Soviet Union), spent the 1990's grasping for a long-term strategy to replace containment. The terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, Barnett argues, revealed the Gap between an outdated Cold War-era military and a radically different one needed to deal with emerging threats.He believes that the United is the prime mover in developing a "future worth creating" due to its ability to ensure security around the World.
Above all, The Pentagon's New Map is an important book and a brilliantly well-written argued work. Barnett was highly rated Pentagon briefer, and his ideas have come before all the big shots like Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld. As we affirmed earlier, theories developed by the author have already an impact in Iraq. Iraqi forces are already being designed with Leviathan/System Administrator distinction in mind. Dean Barnett has been brought to love most about the book because it is suffused with a "can-do America optimism" that has been the mark of the United States since its birth. Dean Barnett is also convinced that if someone would bring Barnett's positive vision before the American public, the United States would decide that the future of The Pentagon's New Map is worth fighting for and makes the necessary sacrifices.
Barnett's book is most useful in describing this environment where people who rely on secrets are completely out of touch with the reality, and service chiefs focus on protecting their budgets rather than accomplishing or even defining their mission. In reference to Robert D. Steele, Barnett appears to have discovered the catholic mafia within the naval services, and his several references throughout the book lend weight that the United States needs to do religious counter-intelligence within the government.
However Barnett's theory and ideas have some flaws. We mentioned earlier that the author did not provide the reader a clear definition of the concept of "connectivity "which in fact means globalization. He just tells the reader that connectivity makes the difference between the Core and the Gap. The reader also needs a better test for determining whether a country is Core which includes countries such as the United States of America, France, Germany, New Core including China, India, Seam States such as Mexico, Brazil, Turkey, or the Gap including Iran, Iraq, Africa etc…). This is critical since the litmus test for whether the United States is warranted in acting unilaterally to remove a regime is whether the country in in the Gap or not. The author does not provide with any definition, any litmus test or any legitimacy.
When Barnett characterizes the US role as Leviathan, it is in fact a call for an American Empire. Thus, he calls for the American rules rather than American Rule. But this is not what Leviathan is about. It is not a call for a universal system of consensual rule by law. It is a demand for a powerful sovereign to keep peace. Reactionary types will certainly accuse
the author of being some kind of Neo-imperialist or a "global fascist". In addition, there is an assumption that once a nation is part of the Core, it always will be. It is not sure when we consider the Nazi Germany which abandoned voluntarily globalization Core I. Some New Core members for demographic reasons have become part of the Gap, the case of China. Barnett tends to concentrate the entire model on the United States only. There no real responsibilities given to any part of the Core, except the United States.
Barnett is disappointing when he claims that he is the first to get the situation across, with the view that the United States lacked visionaries, and the implication is that he is the first to come forward. This is not true. America has had visionaries such as John Boyd, Bill Lind and Mike Wylie. The author's recommendations that place Africa last on the list of those areas to be "saved" are not correct. His overall recommendations are simplistic, focusing on the standard litany for "Pentagon go-along" : Iraq, Iran, the Middle-East, China, Asian NATO, and Africa. Barnett suggests that globalization will bring an increasing level of prosperity to the regions it touches. But when it comes to African countries for example, they cannot compete in this context with rich countries.
Finally, Barnett's book is too optimistic so that it can be compared to Noran Angell's Great Illusion of 1910 published to great acclaims, arguing that war was unthinkable since economically interdependent States had so much to lose from it.
Barnett is also the author of The Pentagon`s New Map: Blue Print For Action/ A Future Worth Creating. The purpose of the first book was to find something to do in the post-Cold War World, and what it found was a program of employing American military force against third World countries. The book did propose a follow-on "System Administrator" force, but it was made up of older troops and Reservists. In Blueprint For Action, the "System Administrator" moves to the forefront with Leviathan playing the limited role of enabler, and the Leviathan concept has changed according to Chet Richards. Also, in Blueprint, Leviathan acts only within an internationally sanctioned framework. It is true that the US military is capable of winning any conventional war, but without substantial international backing, that the United States will not get if it alone makes the decision for war, the superpower will inevitably become bogged down in the resulting peace. The concept of peace is also developed beyond what he described in the first Pentagon`s New Map. Rather than dead-ender of the former regimes, Barnett adopts the more nuanced notion of "fourth generation warfare". Chet Richards abruptly argues that the Blueprint is a better book than The Pentagon's New Map.

In the end, The Pentagon's New Map provides a good overview of the World, an assessment of what works and what doesn't, a vision of what the World could look like if the United States puts its enormous resources to work to bring about the possibilities the author describes.
Barnett is considered as a "post-modern Nimrod" and a George F. Keeman for the new century. There is a lot of the book not to like: it is long because of the author's endorsements of both himself and of Iraq. But this is a book which offers a coherent vision for action from national goal to "grand strategy", and down to strategy, operations and even tactics.
To those have an interest in the future for national security policy across the globe, I strongly recommend The Pentagon's New Map.



SELECTED SOURCES

Bakke, (P.), "Review of the Pentagon's New Map", in: Arizona 360 Blue, (Tucson, AZ, July 31, 2006),
4 pages.

Barnett, (D.), "The Pentagon's New Map: The Book You Still Have to Read", Friday, January 5, 2007.
Retrieved from: http://hughhewitt.townhall.com/g/fd294e75-4388-4clc-b5cb-3fda08c9ecfa

Barnett, (T.P.M.), The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century, (New-York: G.P.
Putman`s Sons, 2004), 435 pages.

"Connections, Core, and Gap: Thomas Barnett's Pentagon's New Map". Retrieved from:
http://theglitterneye.com?p=1149.

Fox, (W.), "Review of The Pentagon's New Map", July 12, 2006. Retrieved from
http://www.amazon.com/Pentagons-new-Thomas-P-Barnett/dp/0399151753.

Fukuyama, (F.), The End of History and the Last Man, (New-York: Free Press, 1992).

Huntington, (S.P.) "The Clash of Civilizations", in: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No3, (Summer 1993).

Kaplan, (R.D.), The End of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century, (Random House, 1996),
476 pages.

Krelsler, (H.), "Thomas P. M. Barnett: Conversation with History", Interview from the Institute of
International Studies, (U.C: Berkeley, March 8, 2005). Retrieved from:
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people5/barnett/barnett-con-l-html.

Owen, (T.), "A Core, A Gap, A Map", in: National Review, (May 17, 2004).

Richards, (C.), Blueprint for Action Review", (November 21, 2005).

Steele, (R.), "Young Man Narrowly Read, Has Big Idea with Few Details", (July 14, 2004). Retrieved from:
http://www.amazon.com/pentagons-new-Thomas-P-M-Barnett/dp/0399151753.

Stromberg, (J.R.), "A Post-Modern Nimrod". Retrieved from: http://www.lewrockwell.com/stromberg/stromberg66.html. 9

"The Pentagon's New Map: Books: Thomas P. M. Barnett". Retrieved from: http://www.amazon.com/pentagons-New-thomas-P-M-Barnett/dp/0399151753.





































10

Originary from a Russian peasant family under Stalin's totalitarism, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, a graduate agronmist-economist joined the Soviet Communist Party in the early 1950s. His political ascendance led him to the Politburo in 1979. Following the death of Konstantin Chernenko, he was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1985, and became defacto Ruler of the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev had provided a balanced account of the complexities of politics in the USSR during a period of remarkable change. He moved beyond reform of the Soviet system to the demolition of a number of its pillars. The last leader of the Soviet Union tried to reform the stagnating Communist Party and the State economy. His attempt to reform the country from 1985 to 1991 is considered by many observers as the " supreme drama" of later twentieth-century European history(1).

Part one of this paper emphazises on the broad international context within which the drama unfolded and the reason why domestically, a regime which ten years earlier had seemed to last indefinitely, was so rapidly destabilized. Part two examines the different aspects and the effectiveness of the economic and political reforms namely " perestroïka", democratization, " glasnost" and the military changes as well. Part three is an overall evaluation of Gorbachev's effect in Russia and abroad.

1. The broad international context and the domestic situation of the USSR : 1979-1985

1.1. The broad international context

Within the period between the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 by the Soviet forces and the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet leader in 1985, the international context was characterized by the " Second Cold War" (2). There were marked freeze relations between the superpowers after the détente period of the 1970s.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 in support of an embryonic Communist regime in the country led to international outcries. This military intervention also led to a protracted conflict, which involved Pakistan, a US ally. The deployment of nuclear SS-20 missiles commenced in 1977, pushed NATO allies to agree in 1979 to continue Strategic Arms Limitations Talks(3). The election of Margaret Thatcher as British Prime Minister the same year, and followed by that of Ronald Reagan to the US presidency in 1980, saw the elevation of two hard-line Cold War individuals to the leadership of the Western World. Another initiative from the West and particularly from the US president Ronald Reagan, the Strategic Defence Initiative and Solidarity (4) shows how far the " second Cold War" was.
But when Gorbachev took over power in 1985, the Cold War began to come to an end. The Soviet leader was seen as the man credited with bringing the opportunity of this peaceful issue (5). His foreign policy called the "New Thinking" (6) was in support of the end of the Cold War. Gorbachev perceived that "security is a positive sum-game from which all could benefit through cooperation" (7).
Rather than try to build as many nuclear weapons as possible, Gorbachev proclaimed a doctrine of sufficiency, holding only a minimal number for protection. He believed that the Soviet control over an empire in Eastern Europe was costing too much and providing little benefit.

In addition to this particular international context, the domestic situation of the USSR prior to the rise of Gorbachev also explains the necessity of reforms in the country.

1.2. The domestic situation of the USSR before 1985

In the decade before 1985, the Soviet regime was facing a big amount of problems, and the most crucial was the political and economic stagnation.
From the outside World, everyone agreed that the Soviet Union was the World's second largest economy and, if not the most powerful military force in the World, then a very close sedcond. It produced more machine tools, oil and natural gas than any other country. The country's stock of nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe was at least double than of the United States.
But yet deep within the system, some had begun to question the reality of that apparent strength. In reference to Tat'iana Zaslavskaia (8), the Soviet economy was suffering of shortcomings and a growing inability to compete in an age of high technology (9). As she saw it, the central planning system had outlived its usefulness, and had served reasonably well to acculturate illeterate peasants into an industrial, urban work force. As the Soviet economy became more extensive and complex, the planners could not maintain control of it. Others like Marshall I. Goldman argued that without the market, a planning commission like the "Gosplan", no matter how large it is, will find itself unable to react effectively (10).
Most observations on the stagnation of the Soviet economy focused on its counter productivity. Increasingly, the Soviet industrial system was producing negative value added. The slow growth rate that resulted from the inefficiencies made it impossible to provide a better life for the work force.
By late 1984, Mikhail Gorbachev joined the rank of those who believed that the Soviet Union's economic system could not continue without deep reforms and he concluded that "it was impossible to live that way" (11). This meant a dramatic change not only in the country's political and social life, but also in its economy. He presented his version of what needed to be done during a meeting of Party officials in 1984.

2. Gorbachev factor : 1985-1991

On taking office in 1985, the major problem Mikhail Gorbachev faced was that the Soviet economy had been in a period of stagnation for two decades and was in desperate need of reform. He chose to adjust the old system with the hope of making it more effective.
Domestically, Gorbachev's policy was primarily conducted under three programs commonly known as "perestroika", "glasnost", and " demokratizatsiya", in other words, economic reform, openness and democratization. In fact Brezhnev's government had denied change rather than mastering it. Despite Andropov's efforts to reintroduce some measures of discipline, the Communist superpower remained stagnant. Once Gorbachev began to call for dramatic reforms, the "acceleration"(12) gave way to " perestroika". In reference to Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbahev's Chief economic Adviser, Russians "were going over from an authoritarian to a democratic economy, an economy governed by the people, with substantial involvement of the masses in economic management" (13).

2.1. The economic reform

"Perestroïka" is viewed as the Soviet economic and social reform policy of the late 1980s. According to Gorbachev, it means "priority development of the social sphere aimed at better satisfaction of the Soviet people's requirements for good living and work conditions, for good rest and recreation, education and healthcare" (14). The concept was attached to the attempts by him to transform the stagnant, inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union into a democratized market-oriented economy.

2.1.1. Alcoholic beverage reform

The first reform introduced under Gorbachev was the 1985 alcohol reform which was designed to fight widespread alcoholism in the Soviet Union. Prices of alcoholic beverage raised and their sales restricted. Prosecutions were directed against people who were caught drunk at work and in public. Economically, the reform was a serious blow to the State budget. Alcohol reform was one of the intial triggers that cause a chain of events that ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and deep future economic crisis.
During a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1987, Gorbachev presented his basis theses which laid the political foundation of economic reform. Thus, the reform on State enterprise was engaged.

2.1.2. Reform on State enterprise

The Supreme Soviet passed the law on State enterprise in July 1987. This law stipulated that State enterprises were free and allowed to set many of their prices and wages. For the first time since Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), the law allowed private ownership of businesses in the services, manufacturing and foreign trade sectors.
During 1988-1989, Mikhaïl Gorbachev also issued orders to the party committees to cease interfering in the economy. Their staffs were cut and different ministries involved in the economy as well, in order to prevent them from further tampering with it.
Furthermore, the restructuration of the "All-Union" industrial organizations started. Some enterprises such as Aeroflot were split into a number of independent enterprises. These newly autonomous business organizations were encouraged to seek foreign investment.

2.1.3. The foreign trade reform

Gorbachev's "perestroïka" program virtually eliminated the monopoly that the ministry of foreign trade had once held on most trade operations. The reform permitted the ministries of the various industrial and agricultural branches to conduct foreign trade only in sectors under their responsibilitiy. They are not allowed anymore to operate indirectly through the bureaucracy of trade ministry organizations. In addition to this, regional and local organizations, and individual State enterprises were permitted to conduct foreign trade. This change was an attempt to redress a major imperfection in the Soviet foreign trade regime namely, the lack of contact between Soviet users and suppliers and their foreign partners.
The most significant of Gorbachev's reforms in the foreign economic sector was to allow foreigners to invest in the Soviet Union in the form of joint-ventures with Soviet minitries, State enterprises and cooperatives. But we have to recognize the fact that Gorbachev's economic reform did not do much to restart the country's stagnant economy in the late 1980s. The reforms decentralized things to some extent. Gorbachev may have learned the lesson on the linkage between economic and political reforms. So, while working on economic change, he was also trying "to recreate the Soviet political universe in a way more favorable to long-term reform" (15).

2.2. The political reform

Mikhaïl Gorbachev called for demoratization ; the source of this appeal was an open letter to Brezhnev Witten in 1970 by three leading dissidents : Andreï Sakharov, Roy Medvedev, and Valentin Turchin (16). The dissidents suggested that it was important to widen the decision-making process, to bring in all the elements of the society, including non-Communists to solve the nation's problems.
In the democratization process, Gorbachev decided the infusion of democratic elements such as multicandidate elections into the Soviet political process. He also launched radical political reforms in reducing the Party control of the government apparatus.
In December 1988, the Supreme Soviet approved the establishment of a Congress of People's Deputies, which constitutional amendements had established as the Soviet Union's new lesgilative body. Elections to the Congress were held throughout the USSR in March and April 1989. On March 15, 1990, Gorbachev was himself elected as the first executive president of the Soviet Union.
The second crucial element in Gorbachev`'s political strategy is "glasnost" also called "openness".

2.3. Ideological and cultural reforms

During an interview in 1989, Mikhaïl Gorbachev was quoted as saying "I detest lies" (17). Obviously it was this yearning for the truth that leads him to introduce the policy of " Glasnost", which had the same purpose of democratization. Certainly, it was a weapon to be used against conservative opponents. "Glasnost" gave new freedoms to the people, such as a greater freedom of speech. In fact, the Soviet Press could criticize senior Communist officials. This was a radical change, as control of speech and suppression of government criticism had previously been a central part of the Soviet system. The Press became a liberal Press and allowed to grow and flourish within the USSR (18). It was in newspapers, television shows and magazines that the Soviet Unions's past was examined, and the real truth revealed to the people (19).
Gorbachev's goal in undertaking " glasnost" was to pressure Conservatives within the CPSU who opposed his policies of economic restructuring. He also hoped that through different ranges of openness, debate and participation, the Soviet people would support his reform initiatives. In refrence to Coleman, " the change was intoxicating to ordinary Russians. Initially it looked lie the end of the Party's ideological stranglehold over the media, but it soon proved to be a far cry from freedom of the Press as known in the West" (20).
On this openness were added the Military reforms in the Soviet Union.

2.4. The Military reform

From 1988 through 1991, the issue of Military reform appeared with increasing frequency on the Soviet national agenda. The reform that polarized the Military institution was the system of personnel recruitment. The major preoccupation was to transform the Soviet Army to a volunteer professional Army. One of the proposals for restructing the Armed forces appeared in 1988 in the weekly Moscow News(21).
In reference to Savinki, the Soviet Army had to be organized into a " professional-militia"force, with a small core group of highly trained professionals and a network of local militia (22). But the first plan for Military reform was presented by the Ministry of Defense in June 1990, and consisted of the withdrawal of troops from eastern Europe, their redeployment, troop reductions, cuts in strategic forces and resolution of social problems in the Armed forces (23).
Domestic efficiency was seen as absolutely critical for a State's international reputation. Therefore, domestic reforms were inextricably tied to Foreign policy considerations. So Gorbachev will develop his " New Thinking" Doctrine (24).

2.5. Gorbachev's " New Thinking" Doctrine

Mikhaïl Gorbachev saw expansionism disadvantageous ans costly. The costs of maintainng Soviet control over Eastern Europe, coupled with those of the Afghanistan invasion were seen as illustrative of this point. Furtheremore, for him, security was a positive sum-game, that is, international cooperation was seen as potentially beneficial for that security (25). This latter concept reinforced the anti-expansionism of Gorbachev's Doctrine.
Another important underlying theme within the " New Thinking" Doctrine was the " balance of interests" (26), which was seen as more relevant to contemporary Soviet needs than the " balance of power" (27). In this Doctrine, the implications for previous Brezhnev Doctrine (28) are clear : no longer was the protection of socialist regimes, through direct Soviet military intervention, seen as crucial to broader Soviet national security.
National security under the new doctrine was reframed to " fit domestic imperatives" (29). A deteriorating Soviet economy influenced Gorbachev to think seriously about the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. This withdrawal was an important condition to improve relations with the West. The reduction of military spending, an attractive economy and trade concessions were necessary for domestic reforms. Here the "balance of interests" is relevant. One could affirm that Gorbachev's speech in February 1986 to the Party Congress marked the first clear statement of the Soviet intention to withdraw(30).
The policy of "non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other Warsaw States proved to be the most important aspect of Gorbachev's Foreign policy reforms. After having established a new system of reforms, the Soviet leader found himself caught within many criticisms.

3.Evaluation of Gorbachev's reforms

3.1. Evaluation of " perestroïka"

Gorbachev's economic policy gradually brought the country close to disaster. By the end of the 1980s, severe shortages of basic food supplies led to the reintroduction of the food cards distribution system. The system limited each citizen to a certain amount of products per month. The general quality of life of the Soviet people did not improve as expected, in the contrary, it deteriorated. Instead the Soviet economy went from stagnation to deterioration. Over inflation became a major problem. In sum, the Soviet Union left a legacy of economic inefficiency and deterioration to the fifteen constituent republics after its breakup in 1991.
The failure of "perestroïka" has led observers to qualify the reforms as a " catastroïka" (31). Others saw it as " a stupidity, probably caused by good intentions, which resulted in an absolute lack of responsibility" (32). Some conspiracy theorists believe that the system of " perestroïka" was put in place to decieve the West that Russia was friendly, and that the Soviet leadership is still intact (33). But the real question is how did " perestroïka" fail so miserably ?
In reference to Graham James, Gorbachev never planned to remake the Soviet system, he merely wanted to modernize it (34). Minor adjustments he implemented were his attempts to discipline the work force by using slogans such as "intensification" and " acceleration" (35). But the truth is that slogans are not new in the Soviet Union. Another reason of the failure was Gorbachev's continual boasting about the results that the reforms would have. By predicting a significant improvement of the people's quality of life that never happened, Gorbachev was unmasked as "an inept planner and of being incapable of making much needed decisions" (36).
Gorbachev failed to bring any significant change to the Soviet economy which was in decline. His insistence on slow gradual economic reforms annulled any positive effects that the reforms might have had. This reluctance to introduce meaningful free market reforms to the Soviet economy lost Gorbachev the support of the people. Even his political changes were not less criticized.

3.2. The "autopsy" of Gorbachev's political reforms

The political reforms initiated by Mikhaïl Gorbachev were positive regarding freedom and democracy in the Soviet Union.
Under "glasnost", the Soviet people were able to learn significantly more about horrors committed by the government when Joseph Stalin was in power. Political openness continued to produce unintended consequences : the ability of the USSR central Moscow government to impose its will on the constituent republics of the Union had been largely undermined. The Baltic States used the reforms provided by the " glasnost" to assert their rights to protect their environment and their historic monuments. Later, those States claimed sovereignty and independence. The rise of Nationalism under " glasnost" also reawakened ethnic tensions throughout the Union. The freedoms generated under political changes enabled increased contact between Soviet citizens and the Western World, particularly with the United States. For example, restrictions on travel were loosened, allowing increased business and cultural contact. Many political prisoners and dissidents were released in the spirit of " glasnost".
But Gorbachev's original goal of initiating political changes to reform the Soviet Union was not achieved.
One of the major failures was the complete dislocation of the Union in 1991. But the question is why these political reforms failed ?
Coleman reminds us that the term "democracy" in the Soviet lexicon is a perverse abuse of language, because in the Soviet context, "it involved only dubious staged spectacles of broad support from the masses" (37). He added that Gorbachev designed democratization of the country with narrow aims and minds(38).
Another reason of this failure is that the hard-line apparatchiks still strong within the CPSU were completely opposed to anything which might lead to the breakup of the Soviet motherland.
Of many assertions about the collapse of Communism and particularly the failure of Gorbachev's reforms, those of Zbiniew Brzezinsky (39) seem relevant, because they were done some years before. His predictions have turned out largely true. Brzezinsky predicted five possibilities or scenarios on what would happen in the future in the country : a possible successful pluralization, a protracted crisis, a renewed stagnation, a military coup or the explicit collapse of the Communist regime. He added that "there is a much more possibility that the collapse happens than the protracted crisis (40). Finally, when the end does come in a few more decades, Brzezinsky argued that " i twill be more likely turbulent" (41).
When discussing the specific causes of the collapse of Communism, he talked about the notion of " organic rejection"(42), because the Marxis-Leninist ideology " failed to take into account the basic human craving for individual freedom" (43). Under Communism there were no free elections, no freedom of speech, and no freedom of organization. One might try to argue that denying people individual freedom could be a source of instability in the long run. So "organic rejection" has so been far interpreted to mean the rejection of an ideology with consequences incompatible with human nature. Finally the hard evidence why reform was more difficult in the USSR is that the Soviet peasantry had been wiped out when agricultural policies were changed.

In conclusion, Gorbachev is generally well regarded in the West for having put an end to the Cold War. However in Russia, his reputation is very low, because he is percieved to have brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev is held responsible for the economic misery that followed.
Despite of this, a majority of Russians are pleased with the result of the individual aims of " perestroïka" and the freedom generated by "glasnost".
In contrast to the controversial domestic reforms, Gorbachev was largely hailed for his " New Thinking" in Foreign policy. He understood the link between achieving international détente and domestic reforms, and pushed on resolving the race of nuclear weaponry. As a result, Mikhaïl Gorbachev is for some analysts considered as the most important Statesman of the twentieth century : first he opened the way for the future real change in his country. Second, in reference to Kaiser, G.R., his merit is that "nothing is more difficult than taking the lead in the introduction of a new order of things" (44).



ENDNOTES

1- Acton, E. "Gorbachev and the Break-Up of the USSR, 1985-1991". Retrieved from http://www.uea.ac.uk/his/webcours/Russia/courses/gorby-ma.shtml
2- "Second Cold War". Retrieved from http://www.enwikipedia.org/wiki/cold_war
3- The purpose of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) was to constrain the number of nuclear missiles for battlefield targets.
4- The Strategic defensive Initiative and Solidarity commonly called "Star Wars", was proposed by the US president Ronald Reagan on March 1983, to use ground-based and space-based military arsenals to protect the United States from attack by strategic nuclear balistic missiles.
5- Coleman, F. (1996). The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire. New-York ; St Martin's Press, p. 217.
6- "New Thinking " was Gorbachev's slogan for a Foreign policy based on shared moral and ethical principles. He chose to exercise political influence ranging from the enhacement of diplomatic relations and economic cooperation.
7- Nye, J. S. (1999). Understanding International Conflicts. Ontario : Longman, p. 128.
8- A social scientist at the Siberian Division of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, author of a long study detailing the weaknesses of the Soviet economy entitled : "The Voice of Reforms", (1989).
9- Zaslavskaia, T. (1989). "The Voice of Reforms".
10- Goldman, M. I. (1992). " Perestroïka" in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Retrieved from http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Perestroika.html
11- Ibid.
12- Coleman, F. (1996). p. 228.
13- Ibid.
14- Gorbatchev, M. (1987). Perestroïka, New-York : Harper Collins, quoted in : Kishlansky, M. (2001). Sources of the West : Reading in Western Civilization, 4th edition, Vol. 2. New-York ; Longman, p. 322.
15- Coleman, F. (1996). p. 230.
16- In reference to Coleman, F., this open Letter compared the Soviet society to a "Traffic moving through an intersection. In Stalin's days, there were few cars. The Police easily controlled the flow. Then the stream of traffic continually grew until adding police or increasing fines was no longer the answer. The only solution is to widen the intersection".
17- Coleman, F. (1996). p. 231.
18- Ogonyuk, a popular current affairs Magazine had a circulation of three million by 1990 according to the data in Time Magazine, 4 june 1990, p. 19.
19- Graham, J. "Glasnost". Retrieved from http://www.historyorb.com/Russia/glasnost.shtml
20- Coleman, F. (1996). p. 231.
21- Savinkin, A. " What Kind of Army Do We Need ?" in : Moscow News, Nov. 1988, p. 6.
22- Ibid.
23- Vitaly, V.S.(Nov. 1995). " The War in Chechnya : Implications for Military Reform and Creation of Mobile Forces". A Paper for the Annual Conference on Russian Defense Decision-Making, Montery, California, pp. 3-4.
24- Nye, J. S. (1999). Understanding International Conflicts. 3rd Edition, Donmillis, Ontario : Longman, p. 128.
25- Ibid.
26- Malley, W. (2002). The Afghanistan Wars. New-York : Palgrave Macmillan, p. 116.
27- Ibid.
28- First enunciated in the wake of 1968 Soviet led intervention in Czecholovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine mandates direct Soviet assistance to socialist governments.
29- Mendelson, S.E. (1998). Changing Course : Ideas, politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, Princeton : Princeton University Press, p. 115.
30- Khan, Riaz, M. (1991). Untying the Afghan Knot : Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal, Durham : Duke University Press, p. 179.
31-A Russian word which means an amalgamation of "catastrophe" and "perestroïka". It is used by Philip Hanson in his book : From Stagnation to Catastroika : Commentaries on the Soviet Economy, 1983-1991.
32-Yakovlev, A. (1993). " The Future of Democracy in Russia : The Lessons of Perestroika and the Question of the Communist Party". Retrieved 1993 from http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/Yakovlev/yak-elbl.html
33-"Perestroïka". Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/perestroika
34-Graham, J." Glasnost". Retrieved from http://historyorb.com/Russia/glasnost.shtml
35-Ibid.
36-Ibid.
37-Coleman, F. (1996), op. cit., p. 244-245.
38- Ibid.
39-Former President Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, who advocated a hardline
toward the Soviet regime in USSR, and became an influential voice and contributor on
US global political issues.
40-Brzezinsky,. (1989). The Grand Failure : The Birth and the Death of Communism in the
Twentieth Century, New-York : Charles Schribner's Sons, p. 245.
41-Ibid., p. 255
42-Ibid., p. 278
43-Ibid., p. 242
44-Kaiser, G.R. (1991). Why Gorbachev Happened : His Triumphs and His Failure,
New-York : Simon and Schuster, p. 423.


SELECTED SOURCES

Brzezinsky, Z. (1989). The Grand Failure : The Birth and the Death of Communism in the
Twentieth Century, New-York : Charles Schribner's Sons
Coleman, F. (1996). The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire. New-York : St Martin's Press
Gorbachev, M. (1987). Perestroïka. New-York : Harper Collins
Kaiser, G. R. (1991). Why Gorbachev Happened : His Triumphs and His Failure, New-York :
Simon and Schuster
Khan, R. M. (1991). Untying the Afghan Knot : Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal, Durham : Duke University Press
Malley, W. (2002). The Afghanistan Wars. New-York : Palgrave Macmillan
Nye, J.S. (1999). Understanding International Conflicts. Ontario : Longman.
Mendelson, S.E. (1998). "Changing Course : Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from
Afghanistan", Princeton University Press
Vitaly, V.S. (1995). " The War in Chechnya : Implication for Military reform and Creation of
Mobile Forces", Montery, california
Savinkin, A. (1988). " What Kind of Army Do We Need ?" in : Moscow News
Zaslavskaia, T. (1989). "The Voice of Reform"
Acton, E. " Gorbachev and the Break-up of the USSR, 1985-1991". Retrieved from :
http://www.uea.ac.uk/his/webcours/Russia/courses/gorby-ma.shtml
Goldman, M. I. (1992). "Perestroïka". Retrieved from http://www.encolib.org/library/Enc/perestroika
Graham, J. " Glasnost". Retrieved from http://historyorb.com/Russia/glasnost
"Second Cold War". Retrieved from http://www.en.wikipedia.org/
Yakovlev, A. (1993). "The Future of democracy in Russia : The Lessons of Perestroïka and
the Question of the Communist Party". Retrieved 1993 from http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/Elberg/yakovlev/yak-elbl.html

A Thought Piece

The theoretical logic behind the association between democracy and economic development


A democratic regime is defined as a political regime in wchich rulers are selected through free and contested elections. Economic growth is measured by per capita income, the increase and fair distribution of incomes and resources. It also includes investment.

The suggestion that there is a mutual reinforcing relation between democracy and economic development and diversification is obvious. So, what are the outcomes of this association ? In which region of the World this theoretical association has failed ?
This piece examines first, how democracy and economic development reinforce each other, and second, the failure of this association in Subsaharan African countries.

The answers to two questions can help to explain how democracy and economic development could reinforce each other. The first question is : does economic development impact the emergence and the survival of political regimes such as democracy ? The second question is : does a political regime (democracy) affect economic development performance ?
The modernization theory supports that democratic regimes are more likely to emerge and survive in coutries economically developed. The survival of democratic regimes depends on the level of development. According to some studies, more than forty democracies collapsed in poor countries since the end of WWII. In contrast, more than thirty democracies survive almost a thousand years in wealthy countries and not even one died. Democracy is fragile in countries with poor economy.
Arguments in favor of democracy assert that democracies allocate better the available resources to productive uses because they are accountable to the electorates. They better protect property rights, they allow free long-term investments. Democracies improve the quality of economic decisions by allowing the free flow of information. They use more effectively labor, pay higher wages and benefit more from technical progress.
In the other hand, contradicting arguments about this association are making are their way.

The fear that democracy could undermine economic development emerged with the birth of new nations in Asia and Africa. In 1959, Walter Galeson and Karl De Scwweimitz in their writings argued that in poor countries, democracies lead to immediate consumption and undermine investments and economic growth. According to them, the more democratic a conutry or a government is, the greater the diversion of resources from investment to consumption. Samuel Huntington underlines the fact that the higher priority of the parties is personal consumption of the voters. This undermines investment. The arguments against democracy claim that it hinders growth by reducing investment. This assertion is true for Subsaharian African countries.
After almost thirty years into the "Third wave" of global democratization and a dozen after the collapse the Soviet-bloc Communism, Africa and particularly Subsaharan African countries are experiencing democratization. Benin, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria are some examples. In those countries, the asumption that democracy and economic development reinforce each other is not yet a reality. Mali, Ghana and Benin for example are still very poor despite their democratic regime and reforms they adopted. In other countries of the sub-region, the process of democratization is on the way. But generally, the system of democratic governance in the countries is still to survive and move forward. Those countries are still facing a variety of challenges and among them : corruption, the lack of good faith in certain leaders, the politics of exclusion, failed leadership and the absence of economic cohesion among them. All these patterns are not to enhance economic growth despite the instauration of democracy.

Finally, democratic regimes make a difference for economic welfare. The difference between poor and rich countries is enormous. If democracies emerge occasionally in poor coutries, they remain fragile when facing poverty. In wealthy countries they survive. The mutal reinforcing association between democracy and economic development and diversification only works in rich countries.


Selected Sources

John F. Helliwell, "Empirical Linkages Between Democracy And Economic Growth, in British Journal of Political Science, vol. 24, pp. 225-248, April 1994.

Larry Sirowy and Alex Inkeles, "The Effects of Democracy on Economic Growth and Inequality : A Review", in Comparative International Development, vol. 25, no 1, pp. 126-157, Spring 1990.

Richard W. Rahn, "Democracy Versus Economic Growth, in The Washington Times, May 16, 2011.

Samuel Huntington and Joan M. Nelson, No Easy Choice : Political Participation in Developing Countries, Harvard University Press, 1976.

A Thought Piece : What are the "Pros" and the "Cons" of trying to use economic sanctions to end military threats or warfare ? Do such sanctions work better to stop a conflict between two or more sovereign states or between two or more armed domestic rivals ?


Multilateral and unilateral economic sanctionc have long preoccupied both international relations scholars and policymakers as a tool of statecraft. Thus, predisposition led to a strong interest in sanctions as an alternative to armed conflict or military threats. This is reflected in the increase of sanctions taken by the United Nations Security Council under chapter VII of the Charter, as well as other regional and multilateral settings.

Part 1 of this essay will assess the types of economic sanctions implemented to end warfare. Part 2 will examine the'pros' and'cons' arguments over the use of those non-military measures. Part 3 will assess the practicality and effectiveness or failure of those non-military measures in the light of two examples of sovereign states (Iraq and the former Republic of Yugoslavia), and one domestic rivalry in Angola, involving UNITA(National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola).
In her "UN sanctions regime and violent conflict", Chantal De Jonge Oudraat assimilates economic sanctions to non-military measures, which purpose is to restrict normal international economic exchanges with a state or a group, in order to seek political or military behavior change. The theory of sanctions hightlights the economic costs translated into political effects, meaning that the troublemaking states or elites must change their political and military behavior.
Distinct types of economic sanctions are implemented today. Chantal De Jonge underlines the "comprehensive" and "partial" sanctions which ultimately include a multitude of services and goods, or specific services and strategic goods. In addition, "target" sanctions consist of freezing designated corporate or individual overseas assets. Arms embargoes are imposed to restrict military capabilities to avoid or prevent conflict.
So what are the "pros" and "cons" arguments on the use of economic sanctions to end military threats or warfare ?

In her International sanctions in contemporary perspective, Magaret Doxey looks to sanctions as a means of promoting human rights. Hufbauer Schott and Elliot in their Economic sanctions reconsidered show the positive contribution made by economic sanctions in terms of their foreign policy outcomes. Higher economic costs of sanctions to the target country according to these scholars increase the likehood of success. Some scholars add perequisites for the success of economic sanctions : Risa Brooks considers that regime type affects the impact of the non-military measures. She argues that sanctions are more effective against democratic regimes than authoritarian regimes. The reason is that against a democratic target state, trade and financial comprehensive sanctions are effective as are sanctions that targets exports. Zachary Selden implies that some governments can use sanctions to their benefits. If the governement elites become wealthier because of sanctions to remain in place.
The overall assessment of the'pros''s arguments is that economic sanctions are only ineffective if they are not carefully planned, defined and executed. Economic sanctions not only stimulate diplomacy, but also enhance the individual rights.

The'cons's arguments relied on the harmful effect of economic sanctions. Ernest Preeg says that the impact of economic sanctions is more likely to harm people, especially the poorest, while authoritarian regimes become more repressive. Those regimes use them as propoganda to blame internal economic problems as well as the initiators of those sanctions against them. Robert P. O'Quinn highlights that economic sanctions strengthen "rogue states", harm the professional and business classes that have the greatest stake in the international economy, slow the development of the middle class and thus democracy. Robert Pape supports that unpopular ruling elites can often protect themselves and their followers by shifting the economic burden of sanctions onto opponents.
The overall assessment of the'cons's argument is that the economic sanctions are ineffective at reaching their established objectives. They fail to affect their intended targets and unjustifly affect innocent. The'cons' recognized that economic sanctions are unjust and objectionable.
But the natural question is in which context do such sanctions work better ? Are they more successful in stopping a conflict between two or more states or between two or more armed domestic rivals ?

The first example that can elucidate our assessment is the Iaqi invasion of Kuwait involving two sovereign states in August 1990. Following the UN Security Council vote on multilateral sanctions against Iraq, "comprehensive" economic sanctions were imposed on that country, because the invasion violated the international law, thus illegal. All imports and exports from and to Iraq were barred, except medical supplies, foods and other items of humanitarian need. The UN resolutions authorized a naval blockade. The weak economy predisposed the country for sanctions. Postwar economic sanctions last for almost a decade. There is an assumption that postwar sanctions have been effective in terms of their economic impact in Iraq. Its GDP collapsed at the 1960's level. However, the sanctions have been less effective from a political point of view. Saddam Hussein remained in power, and did not give up on developing weapons of mass destruction according to US officials.
The second example refers to the former Republic of Yugoslavia against which "comprehensive" economic sanctions were imposed because of its involvement in the Bosnian war. Other former republics of Yugoslavia also were struck with arms embargoes until 1996. Yugoslavia had a vulnerable economy, thus a good candidate for sanctions. Scholars such as Stremlau in his Sharpening International Sanctions gives credit to the implementation of economic sanctions in the country, namely unprecedented international arrangements to enforce the UN Security Council measures. But the political conditions for imposing sanctions were less ideal. Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian leader was still in charge as well the Communist apparatus. That is the reason why other scholars such as Woodward believes the sanctions were not successful.
The third example is the domestic rivalry between UNITA of Jonas Savimbi and the MPLA of Eduardo Dos Santos for the control of power in Angola. Oil and arms embargoes were imposed against UNITA. These partial sanctions took effect in 1997. But they had very little impact on UNITA forces which continued to sell diamonds and procure arms and supplies the movement needed for its war effort.
To assess the context in wchich economic sanctions work better, it is important to consider some economic and political characteristics of the sanction target in reference to Chantal De Jonge, and among them : the nature of economy export and import dependency and international capital market dependency. So, sovereign states have strong dependency on foreign trade as well as on international capital market. Those sovereign states are consequently more vulnerable to economic sanctions. Also, democratic, industrial and ethnically mixed countries are good candidates for sanctions.
In contrast, non governmental or rebel groups are difficult to isolate economically. They are not vulnerable to normal trade sanctions, because they are not engaged in normal trade. They often use the "black" and "gray" markets. So economic sanctions work better to stop a conflict between two or more sovereign states than between two or more armed domestic rivals.

It is clear that there is little consensus among the scholars on the issue of using the economic sanctions. Some are convinced that economic sanctions are successful if they are clearly defined from the outset. Others think that while bolstering the state, "comprehensive" sanctions can weaken potential sources of opposition to the regime in question, handicap the potential agents of change and threatened democracy.
On the other hand, sovereign states are more likely vulnerable to sanctions than non-governmental groups, because of their strong economic dependency to international trade and finance as well as to international capital market.



SOURCES


Chantal De Jonge Oudraat, "UN Sanctions Regimes and Violent Conflict", in Crocker, Chester, A., Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall (eds), Leashing the Dogs of War : Conflict Management in a Divided World (Washington, D.C : US Institute of Peace Press, 2007).

Ernest H. Preeg, Trade Policy Ahead : Three Tracks and One Question, (Washington, D.C.,1995).

Gary Hufauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberley Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, (Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009).

John, J. Stremlau, Sharpening International sanctions : Towards a Stronger Role for the United Nations, (New York : Carnegie Corporation, 1996).

Margaret P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective (St Matin's Press Press, 1996).

Risa Brooks, Civil-Military Relations & Democracy (Baltimore, Maryland : John Hopkins University Press, 1996).

Zachary Selden, Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (Wesport, Connecticut : Praeger Publishers, 1999).

A Thought Piece : International Relations described as a discipline of theoretical disagreements


The study of International Relations helps to understand the way the World works, and various schools of thought within the discipline are continously debating on theoretical issues. This essay will examine two major disagreements namely : Neorealism versus Neoliberalism on the international system of states theory ; then the viewpoints of proponents and opponents of the democratic peace theory, and assess the merits of the opposing arguments in both debates. The second part of the essay will consider the value of studying international relations theory.

Regarding the international system of states theory, neorealist Kenneth Waltz stressed a number of concepts in his Theory of International Politics : the need for a "system theory", the idea of "structure" and the creation of "units" and their "position" in the international system. Three basic postulations are included in his concept of units and structure : the ordering principle, the formal differentiation and the relative capabilities. With these principles, Waltz describes the international system as a system that is decentralized and anarchic where states are actors in anarchy. Neorealists define anarchy as the absence of an authority above states, and as such, there is no authority to mediate conflicts on an international level.

The first reaction to this argument comes from a neoliberal institutionalist Robert Keohane. In his Neoliberal Institutionalism : A Perspective on World Politics, Keohane presents the notion that anarchy and state's power might still play an important role in World politics, but that the international system has become institutionalized. According to him two conditions of the states, as actors should be present in the international system : the"mutual interest", and the "institutional variations". Between Waltz and Keohane, the major disagreement resides on the definitive role state centrism. Therefore, it is clear that both viewpoints(Waltz and Keohane) arrive at quite different core arguments of relative power contrasted with increasing institutionalism.

The second debate of our choice is related to the " Democratic Peace" theory. This concept emerged since the 18th century from Immanuel Kant. This theory has taken place in the 1990s. The proponents' primary claim of "Democratic Peace" is that democratic states do no wage war against each other(James Lee Ray as an example). But this argument was modified by David Lake who argued that democracies are less likely to fight wars each other. The proponents of "Democratic Peace" believe that democratic institutions cause peace, that democracies are trusworthy, and that they promote peaceby increasing contacts.

The opponents have a different idea of democratic peace. Edward Mansfield for example believed that exporting democracy make things worse, and transition to democratization could cause violence and war. Others scholars argue that the absence of war between democracies has little to do with their shared democratic character., but what are the merits of the opposing arguments in both debates ?
Keohane's arguments in the first debate seem more convincing than of Waltz. In fact Keohane's consideration of the possibility of cumulative progress in human affairs stands in the contrary of Waltz, who regards states primarily in terms ofquantity and does not consider their qualities. In the second debate, the opposing arguments to democratic peace seem to have merits.Today we witness how democratic states are engaged in hostile security competition with each other ; they are fighting wars and use violence against authoritarian states (Iraq, Afghanistan) namely the United States, and NATO. They are assimilated to aggressors and pursuing imperialistic policies of subjugation and and belligerence. In 1990 we have witnessed how many countries in Africa and Eastern Europe went through violence during the democratic transition.

Despite disagreements within the field of International Relations, the study of international relations theory remains important and critical, not only for University students but also for policymakers. In fact the international relations theories such as Realism, Liberialism and Constructivism continue to shape both public discourse and policy analysis, in reference to Waltz. The focus of these theories is the distribution of power among states, the emergence of democracies, the turbulence of democratic changes, human rights and international justice. Jack Synder recognizes that policymakers and public commentators invoke elements of these theories when articulating solutions to global security dilemmas.


Sources :

David Lake, Hierarchy International Relations, (Washington, D.C. : Library of Congress, 2009).

Edward Mansfield, Electing to Fight : Why Emerging Democracies Go to War, Washington, D.C., 2005.

Immanuel Kant, Moral Theory, British Library, 1989.

Jack Snyder, "One World, Rival Theories", in Foreign Policy, no 145(Nov-Dec., 2004), pp. 52-62

James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict, Washington, D.C., 1995.

Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979

Robert Keohane, Neoliberal Institutionalism : A Perspective on World Politics, Library Catalogue, 2011.

A Thought Piece : Advantages and disadvantages of coalition warfare and how it has worked in practice

Coalition refers to the temporary or ad hoc alliances formed among non traditional allies or group of nations for some type of joint or common action. It has been used as a term most often in relation to political, national or international issues, such as Georges W. Bush's allied coalition during the Gulf war.
In reference to A. Leroy and James K. Oliver (International Organizations : Principles and Issues), the concept of coalition warfare is relevant to the theory of collective security. David S. Yost in his " Nato's Contributions to Conflict Management" asserts that coalition warfare refers to an intervention by a group of States against an aggression, or internal conflict or disorder with or without the approval of a major-power consensus. Thus, circumstances often dictate that military force must be used as part of a coalition.
To discuss the advantages and disadvantages of coalition warfare, this essay will consider the air power that has been integrated into coalition forces, and how it worked during the following conflicts : Korean War (1950-1953), the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), and the Balkan air campaign (1992-1995).

In each conflict pointed out above, the involvement of the United Nations has been significant, and the interest in operational-level coalition air force interaction in those conflicts has been increasing among theorists of the war. In addition to the UN involvement, air forces of other States provided both political and military benefits for coalition unity. However several disagreements arose but never fractured the coalition outright. International Relations theory attempts to explain why and how nation-states ally. For instance, Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist points out the general advantages and disdvantages of such an agreement. In braod terms, coalition-unique considerations fall into two categories : first, activities that each participating State wants to undertake, and second, activities in which it is capable of participating.
Concerning the Korean War (1950-1953), the invasion of the South by the North on June 1950 led the UN Security Council to adopt several resolutions condemning this attack. Seven nations among sixteen which sent military units contributed air forces to enforce these resolutions(Canada, Greece, Thailand, United States, Britain, Australia, and South Africa).
In reference to Major Peter C. Hunt, the benefits of employing coalition air forces in this war outweighed the costs of controlling the multinational effort. Coalition interaction helped the morale and unity of effort among the various forces. Sharing maintenance and supply proved particularly helpful when the United States and coalitions forces operated the same type of aircraft. The close integration of air forces at the unit level helped tactical level coordination. During this war, several air forces provided unique capabilities that bridged gaps which the United States could not fill. Arrangements for combined search and rescue missions, pilot exchanges seemed to increase the perceived unity of effort.
Although coalition airpower objectives remained relatively stable throughout the war, a variety of actions affected this cohesion. On the negative side, several fratricide incidents threatened to deterirate mutual feelings of trust among the allies. For example, US aircraft mistakenly attacked a British regiment, killing many soldiers. The Royal Air forces attacked a South Korean train carrying civilians. The British criticism of the UN airpower operations raised concern in both the United States and Britain. Britain and Australia had serious disagreements with the US concerning the use of airpower. Languages differences have created significant operational hurdles ; example of the Korean pilots who were unable to speak English (considered as the dominant language of the coalition).
Nevertheless, some lessons can be drawn from the experience of the Korean War : in reference to Dorr, Robert and Warren Thompson (The Korean Air War), coalition airpowers capabilities and intentions should be carefully assessed in peacetime ; the importance of the political dialogue among allies improves the tactical level coordination, and taking into consideration the language factors among the pilots.

Four decades after the North Koreans invaded their neigbors to the South, a similar act of aggression surprised the World in 1990. Iraqi ground troops moved into the small oil-rich emirate of Kuwait and occupied Kuwait-City, claiming the region as a province of Iraq. The UN condemnation of this act of aggression was very swift, as well a s as economic sanctions were enacted. But the Iraqi government was unaffected by these non military measures. So the US officials and other western leaders prepared for the possibility of the use of force which the UN Security Council authorized. Consequently, 36 countries formed a coalition that sent combat units to the Gulf to enforce the UN resolutions, and then the Persan Gulf War started in 1990.
It is in this context that ten coalition air forces flew missions to enforce the UN resolutions. Coalition representation was split between air forces of western nations (the United States, Britain, France, Canada and Italy), and those of the Gulf Cooperation Council States(Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, The United Emirates and Qatar).
In reference to Richard N. Haas ("Using Force : Lessons and Choices for US Foreign Policy"), coalition is tied to legitimacy and this is a big benefit. For example, Arab force contributions in the Gulf war were critical for political more than for military reasons. Because most coalition aircrafts were modern during this war, meaning wertern-built systems, the air component commanders faced few major coalition-unique differences, the interoperability problems were minimized.
The political objectives of the coalition airstrikes were to make it impossible for Saddam Hussein to run his country and to drive a wedge between the Iraqi leadership and the Iraqi people. In reference to "The Instant Thunder Briefing" of the Coalition Central Command (CENTCOM), tremedous results were obtained from the destruction of the Irqi Strategic Air Defense, weakening of the national leadership, to the degradation of telecommunication, railroads and airfields.
However many disagreements threatened the cohesion of the coalition : for example, French seemed most constrained by political directives, two of which directly affected coalition air planning : first, the French flew where it was best for them to fly. They chose targets they wanted to strike, disrupting the overall coalition plan. Because the coalition was so culturally diverse, other factors threatened to degrade its unity : intelligence sharing created suspicions among coalition partners who had fewer means of gathering such information. Fratricide incident incidents("friendly fires" occurred when the US aircraft attacked a British armored personnel courier. Furthermore, the United States, Britain and France differed in their assessment of the types of weapons of mass destruction that Iraqi possessed and Iraqi's potential for using these weapons during the Gulf War. The most important lesson drawn by Miller Ronnie in his Following the Americans in the Persian Gulf from the coalition air power during the Gulf War is that deep cultural awareness regarding friendly forces should be taken into consideration in order to earn their trust.
The last example is the coalition air campaign in the Balkans (1992-1995). As the World fixated on the Persan Gulf crisis in the late 1990, nationalist movements in Yugoslavia threatened to divide the ethnically diverse State. Yugoslav Communist Party's leader Slobodan Milosevic supported minority Serbs in Kosovo since 1987, and who were accused of human rights violations. Civil war erupted in 1991 when Croatia declare independence, and the Yugoslav Army intervened with " ethnic cleansing" campaign to maintain order. When violence broke out in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzogovina, the UN Security Council authorized both "Operation Deny Flight" from 1993 through 1995, and "Operation Dliberate Force" in 1995. Both operations represent the coalition air campaigns in the Balkans.
In reference to Inis Claude, the Kosovo crisis revealed the obligation to take action agaisnt injustice. NATO airpower contribution lasted from 1993 to 1995 in response to the UN request for assistance in implementing the Security Council resolutions. Significant capability advantages were recorded. : NATO airpower in the Balkans included a variety of modern fighter and attack aircraft. The most important capability that non-US forces provided was airborne reconnaissance. Some coalition aircraft adequately performed air-to-air missions of "Denied Flight".This operation essentially destroyed the Serb's command-and-control structure. Almost immediately, the Bosnian Serbs civilians began negotiating, and within months, they signed the cease-fire they had refused to contemplate for three years.
But several disagreements among coalition members affected the unity of effort for operational-level planning. The US contributed no ground troops to the UNPROFOR (United nations Protection Force), while the Europeans, particularly the French and British sent large numbers of troops to the UNPROFOR. Disparities among the allies's ability to gather intelligence and perform battle damage assessment created problems within the alliance. For instance, regarding the intelligence, the French could not get access to US intelligence. Because of the sensitivities related to striking targets, the US could not give the French or other allies information on targets until they receive clearance from political leaders to do so.
Afterall, the Balkan air campaign provides several lessons for dealing with a coalition. In reference to Freedman Lawrence ("Bosnia : Does Peace Support Makes Sense ?", the nature of this operation required commanders to stay attuned to political interests beyond that of their own government ; air component commanders should anticipate the influence of coalition partners on peacetime planning assumption.

In conclusion, the importance of multinational efforts for effective diplomacy is undeniable. Discussions on three airpower coalitions are based on the fundamental premise that commanders try to maximize the coalition-unique benefits while minimizing the coalition-unique problems or disadvantages. On the military level, the coalition benefits or advantages highlighted were the airpower capabilities provided by each partner. The coalition disadvantages were centered primarily around a divergence of objectives either political or airpower, which detracted from the unity effort.



Sources

Alvin, L. Bennet & James K. Oliver, International Organizations : Principles and Issues, Pearson, 2001.

Carl Von Clausewitz, Principles of War, The Military Service Publishing Company, 1942.

David, S. Yost, "NATO's Contributions to Conflict Management", in Chester A. Croker, Fen O. Hampson, & Pamela Aall, Turbulence Peace : The Challenge of Managing International Conflict (Washington, D.C. : US Institute of Peace Press, 2001), pp. 585-602.

Dorr, Robert & Warren Thompson, The Korean Air War, (Zenith Imprint, June 2003).

Freedman Lawrence, " Bosnia : Does Peace Support Make Sense ?", NATO Review, vol. 43, no.6, Nov. 1995.

Inis Claude, Power and International Relations, Random House USA Inc., 1988.

"Instant Thunder Briefing on Coaltion Central Command", in Air Power History, vol. 52, no. 1, 2005.

Miller Ronnie, Following the Americans to the Persan Gulf, Canada, Australia and the Development of the New World Order, Fairleigh Dickinson University, 1994.

Peter, C. Hunt, " Coalition Warfare : Considerations for the Air Component Commander", thesis, Air University, Alabama, 1996.

La Guerre froide économique : les intérêts divergents du multilatéralisme (1948-1992)


Une période de tensions et de confrontations politico-idéologiques entre les deux superpuissances que sont les Etats-Unis et l'URSS et leurs alliés succède au conflit de 1939-1945. La Guerre froide consacre le consensus dans la mise en perspective du phénomène de la bipolarité et de l'antagonisme Est-Ouest. L' édifice politico-juridique et diplomatique du "Containment" du Communisme se met inexorablement en place. Á cet édifice se greffe un antagonisme économique sans merci entre les deux blocs.
Cette guerre froide économique sous-tend l'utilisation des stratégies visant à nuire ou à affaiblir l'économie adverse dans un but politique ou militaire. C'est dans ce contexte international que naît la vision d'un contrôle multilatéral des échanges Est-Ouest et incarnée par la création du COCOM (Comité de Coordination pour le Contrôle Multilatéral) des novembre 1949.
Mais très tôt, les divergences d'intérêts des Etats membres de cet organisme multilatéral apparaissent. Quels sont ces intérêts divergents ? Ont-ils renforcé ou affaibli l'action d'embargo économique du COCOM vs-à- vis du bloc de l'Est et fait obstacle à la lutte contre le Communisme ?

Une approche thématique de la question nous amène à relever trois points : les tenants du contrôle multilatéral, la nature des intérêts divergents et leur corollaire de dispositifs juridiques et techniques, et l'impact de ces divergences sur le multilatéralisme.

Suite au blocus de Berlin en 1949, les Etats-Unis et leurs alliés occidentaux décident d'instaurer un contrôle rigoureux de leurs relations commerciales avec le bloc de l'Est considéré comme ennemi. Il s'agit ni plus ni moins d'un embargo économique. L'objectif est d'interdire l'exportation des technologies propres à augmenter le potentiel militaire des pays du bloc de l'Est. Les technologies visées relèvent principalement du vaste domaine des télécommunications. Le principe du contrôle multilatéral fait une distinction entre les produits devant être soumis à un embargo strict et ceux dont l'exportation est soumis à un barème de quotas. Ainsi sont établies des listes dites 1a, 1b, I, II et III. Les machines-outils, les équipements pétroliers, les instruments de précision et ceux entrant dans la fabrication d'armements sont concernés. Mais les divergences d'intérêts entre les Américains et leurs alliés se font jour.
Au premier plan, figurent les intérêts divergents d'ordre organisationnels et juridictionnels. Deux conceptions s'opposent quant à l'organisation de cet instrument multilatéral qu'est le COCOM. Les Américains, initiateurs de l'idée de l'embargo à destination du bloc soviétique veulent imposer leur marque en proposant de doter le COCOM d'un statut permanent, certes avec des pouvoirs limités, et ne pouvant émettre que des avis. Le camp des "durs" est complété par les Français, les Britanniques, les Belges et les Luxembourgeois. Le camp opposé à ce point de vue et animé par les Pays-Bas et le Danemark, souscrit à une proposition plus souple voire moins contraignante, celle d'organiser le COCOM en un simple comité informel, et ceci au nom de la liberté juridictionnelle en matière de contrôle douanier. Á ces divergences d'intérêts organisationnels et juridictionnels se greffent celles d'intérêts économiques et commerciaux
nationaux.
Au second plan, l'ampleur des listes internationales à édicter divise les Américains et leurs alliés européens. Le système des deux listes semble être la panacée pour les premiers car il interdit objectivement tout commerce significatif avec le bloc soviétique. Par contre les alliés avancent le principe d'une limitation des contrôles aux seuls produits manufacturés de haute technicité, ainsi qu'aux fabrications entrant dans la composition de l'armement. Aussi Français et Britanniques envisagent-ils des dérogations par rapport aux listes proposées par les Américains, et inscrivent en liste d'embargo 23 rubriques et 97 en listes des quotas.
Comme on le voit, à l'intransigeance américaine dictée par la phobie du Communisme, se dresse l'attitude volontariste des Etats européens alliés de préserver leurs liens commerciaux avec le bloc soviétique. Ce volontarisme étant édicté par leur dépendance vis-à-vis des importations alimentaires et énergétiques en provenance des pays de l'Est depuis la fin du 19e siècle.
Au troisième plan, les intérêts d'ordre politiques mettent en exergue la pomme de discorde entre les Etats membres du Comité du système CI/VL relatif à l'octroi des licences imports-exports. Français, Britanniques et Canadiens évoquent la préservation de leur souveraineté, alors que la Suisse s'attache à sa politique d'indépendance et de neutralité. Les premiers avancent un contre-projet moins contraignant en matière de coopération douanière et contrôle des exportations par les seuls Etats concernés. L'opposition à la rigueur du contrôle par les pays européens alliés des Américains, avait pour finalité l'obtention de substantiels allègements pratiques à la théorie de contrôle du commerce Est-Ouest. Aussi des dispositifs juridiques et techniques sont mis en place à cette fin.
La jurisprudence arbitrale établie au sein du COCOM fait état d'un certain nombre de principes, de formules et de pratiques légaux utilisés par les alliés européens. Le principe d'indispensabilité économique permet aux Européens occidentaux de maintenir leurs liens commerciaux avec les pays de l'Est. La formule "Alphand" de dérèglement exceptionnelle associe une dérogation technique au maintien de la sécurité. La "clause de la nation la plus favorisée" jadis signée entre la France et les pays de l'Est est remise sur la table. La pratique des exceptions ainsi que la multiplication des procédures d'exemptions permettent l'obtention des avantages catégoriels. Toutes ces divergences d'intérêts pour une lutte commune, quel bilan peut-on attendre du COCOM en butte à un tel imbroglio ?
Les divergences d'intérêts ont sérieusement handicapé l'action du contrôle multilatéral. Le bilan est indubitablement mitigé. Certes, le contrôle a été utile entre 1949 et 1954, mais mis à rude épreuve pendant les périodes de détente allant des années 1960, 1970 et 1980. La remise en question de la légitimité de l'existence même du contrôle, son caractère plus théorique que pratique amènent les observateurs à qualifier le COCOM de simple chambre d'enregistrement. Pour preuve, les Américains, défenseurs de l'embargo ont été accusés d`au moins 80% de toutes les violations des règles du contrôle en jouant leur carte de la Chine. De plus, l'URSS a survécu, et ne s'est effondrée que sous l'effet du vent de démocratisation des années 1990.

En définitive, la conception d'origine de l'embargo économique édictée par le COCOM a eu son sens dès les débuts de la Guerre froide. Mais les crispations des Etats européens face aux velléités messianiques américaines dictées par la phobie du Communisme en ont effroyablement détérioré la substance et l'efficience. D'une léthargie institutionnelle dès la première détente, l'organe de contrôle multilatéral meurt non seulement des soubresauts des divergences d'intérêts nationaux de ses initiateurs, mais aussi de la profonde décrispation des relations Est-Ouest de l'ère gorbatchévienne, sans avoir accompli sa mission d'éradiquer le Communisme, pour faire place à "l'Arrangement de Wassenaar" en 1994.

Les limites du Droit International dans les Relations Internationales: le fonctionnement du Tribunal International sur le Rwanda.

Á la suite du génocide qui a coûté la vie à près d'un million de Rwandais, le Tribunal Pénal International sur le Rwanda (TPIR) a été créé par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies en novembre 1994 et dont le siège est à Arusha en Tanzanie.
L'urgence de la création d'un tel tribunal ainsi que la mise sur pied de son mandat résultaient au premier chef de juger les personnes présumées responsables d'actes de génocide commis au Rwanda, et dans les Etats voisins par les Rwandais entre le 1er janvier et le 31 décembre 1994. Le second impératif sous-jacent était de combattre l'impunité en utilisant l'instrument judiciaire au service de la réconciliation nationale. Mais à bien des égards, les observateurs avertis en dressent un bilan plutôt mitigé. Adresser les limites du Droit International dans les Relations Internationales à la lumière du fonctionnement du TPIR revient à nous poser la question de savoir, en quoi le fonctionnement du Tribunal est-il révélateur de ces blocages ?
L'approche thématique de la question met en relief deux centres d'intérêt : 1) les limites résultant de la coopération judiciaire aléatoire entre le TPIR et les Etats membres de l'ONU d'une part, et le Rwanda d'autre part, 2) celles relevant des dysfonctionnements internes propres au Tribunal.

Le TPIR a plus que jamais besoin de la coopération judiciaire des Etats membres de l'ONU dans l'accomplissement des objectifs de son mandat. Cette coopération est en jeu dans des procédures telles que les arrestations, les transferts des suspects, la protection des témoins et l`exécution des peines. Sans cette coopération, le Tribunal ne peut fonctionner. Sur le terrain des arrestations, des résistances dommageables de la part des souverainetés nationales subsistent. La réalité est que la capacité d'action du TPIR et de la coopération des Etats dépend du contexte régional et international. Ces arrestations ont brutalement mis en lumière la persistance des "protections" des hautes personnalités rwandaises recherchées par le Procureur. Les cas du puissant homme d'affaires Félicien Kabuya protégé par les autorités kenyannes, d'Augustin Bizimungu et Aloys Ntiwiragabo hommes clés des ex-FAR réfugiés en République Démocratique du Congo sont frappants. La réticence du Conseil de Sécurité d'imposer des sanctions à ces Etats "protecteurs" laisse pantois. De même l'identification et la localisation des suspects sont rendues difficiles du fait de la délivrance facile de vrai-faux documents.
La coopération des Etats ne se limite pas à l'arrestation des suspects, mais elle consiste aussi en leur transfert au siège du tribunal. Sur ce point, si certains Etats ont opéré rapidement le transfert des personnes arrêtées sur leur sol, c- à -d dans un délai inférieur à 4 mois, d'autres par contre n'ont pas été diligents en la matière, accusant ainsi de très longs délais de 9 mois dans le processus. C'est le cas des Etats-Unis pour ce qui est du transfert d` Elizaphan Ntakirutimana. Aussi, le procès de son fils Gérard dont il est co-accusé a été reporté. De même, le délai des transferts de Jean-Bosco Barayagwizi et Laurent Semanza par le Cameroun en 1997 a gravement menacé ces dossiers. Sans la coopération du Rwanda, la gestion des témoins par le Tribunal est difficile, tant il est vrai que la plupart viennent du Rwanda. Même si le TPIR en a progressivement instauré une " protection systématique", celle-ci demeure minimale, car la protection physique réelle des témoins ne se limite qu'à leur passage à Arusha. Ils déposent à visage découvert devant la justice nationale rwandaise. Deux assassinats des témoins de l' accusation s'en sont suivis en 1996 après les procès d'Akayesu et de Rutaganda. Le principe du caractère public des procès a ainsi subi une sérieuse érosion devant le TPIR. Ce problème apparaît comme un symptôme de la faiblesse politique du TPIR qui craint d'être pointée du doigt en cas d'incidents.
La coopération des Etats est aussi cruciale à l'issue du processus judiciaire, quant au lieu d'exécution des peines des condamnés du Tribunal. L'enjeu ici est le soutien financier devant être apporté aux Etats africains qui ont accepté d'accueillir ces prisonniers dans leurs établissements
pénitenciers. Sur ce point, cette coopération avec le TPIR s'est avérée aléatoire, car dans la plupart des cas, les Etats cherchent à en retirer un bénéfice politique à bon compte. Qu'en est-il des limites relevant de la relation avec le Rwanda ?
La relation entre ces deux entités est marquée par la défiance et bien plus par la politisation de la justice par le gouvernement rwandais. Entre 1996 et 1999, l'affaire Barayagwizu s'est avérée un piège politique pour le TPIR, mais adroitement utilisée par les autorités rwandaises. La mise en liberté et la suspension de toute poursuite judiciaire contre le suspect a amené le gouvernement à culpabiliser le Tribunal, et à travers l'institution, la communauté internationale. Ce même gouvernement a également eu du mal à digérer que le Tribunal International vienne à son insu " pêcher" tranquillement d'anciens hauts responsables du régime arrêtés au Cameroun sur sa demande. Á la même période, les exhumations effectuées par les enquêteurs du TPIR avaient provoqué un tollé dans l'opinion publique rwandaise qui trouvait la pratique indécente.
Dans ce même chapitre, l'appropriation par la société rwandaise de la justice internationale instaurée en son nom et à sa demande, s'avère aujourd'hui extrêmement limitée voire nulle. Le TPIR apparaît très isolé de la société rwandaise. Cette limitation est le symptôme le plus sérieux et le plus immédiatement exprimé de l'impressionnant fossé qui le sépare de la population du Rwanda. Pour les Rwandais, ce Tribunal qu'ils ne voient pas ne leur appartient pas. Très offusqués de la confiscation de sa justice par la communauté internationale, Ils y voient en revanche une façon pour elle de se dédouaner de son action en 1994, d'où leur manque d`intérêt. Le juge manquera toujours de légitimité aussi longtemps que le Tribunal ne sera pas en contact avec les victimes des crimes. Mais les dysfonctionnements internes propres à cette institution judiciaire internationale sont aussi révélateurs de ces limites.
Dans ce registre, des blocages bureaucratiques inacceptables et préjudiciables au travail du Tribunal ont été observés. La lenteur des procédures, voire les retards des procès entraînent des situations préoccupantes en matière de détention préventive. Joseph Kanyabashi et Elie Ndayambaje par exemple sont emprisonnés depuis six ans sans procès. Les compétences douteuses du personnel du parquet font que la situation du bureau du procureur demeure un constant sujet de préoccupation. Plusieurs avocats généraux ont été remplacés et des postes inscrits au budget restent vacants. Le problème de compétence et de formation se pose aussi au niveau des enquêteurs. Sur ce point, un autre sujet d'inquiétude est celui du recrutement des enquêteurs de la défense, dont certains sont des personnes recherchées au Rwanda, car figurant sur les listes des suspects de génocide établies par le gouvernement rwandais.
La qualité de préparation et de conduite des dossiers a été mise en cause dans les affaires Musema et Bagilishema. Les luttes de pouvoir internes sont de nature à enfreindre le travail du Tribunal. En effet la gestion catastrophique de la défense révèle les dérives politiques du greffier, car l'assistance judiciaire est tronquée d'abus tant pour les suspects que pour les équipes de défense. Les conseils sont parfois sujets à des chantages de leurs clients. Cette situation est malsaine, et donne l'apparence au TPIR d'être devenu une source inépuisable de l'enrichissement pour les équipes de défense et les familles des victimes. De même la gestion budgétaire erronée de la part de l'administration du Tribunal fait souvent échec aux arrestations, à l'instar de ces quatre arrestations manquées en 1998 selon un rapport confidentiel du gouvernement américain.

En définitive, les limites dans l'application du Droit International à la lumière du fonctionnement du TPIR ne peuvent occulter le fait que le Tribunal ait eu des moyens mis à sa disposition par la communauté internationale. Il est lieu de renforcer certains domaines tels que : l`indemnisation des victimes comme ce fut le cas pour le TPIY en ex-Yougoslavie, renforcer l'information et sa présence au Rwanda pour une réappropriation des procès par les Rwandais, remédier à ses dysfonctionnements internes, et bien plus, exiger la coopération franche des Etats membres de l'ONU. C`est seulement à ce prix que le TPIR sortira de sa léthargie.

Small Arms Acquisition and Insecurity in ECOWAS Countries: Nigeria as a Case Study


ABSTRACT
The African continent suffers enormously from internal conflicts and armed violence. The widespread proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons are a nightmare for governments and policymakers. Nigeria the most populous country among the fifteen members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) faces this security dilemma. The purpose of the present study is to examine the role small arms acquisition plays in the instability and insecurity of the country.

Keywords: Small Arms; Light Weapons; Acquisition; Insecurity; ECOWAS; Nigeria.






Section 1: Research Question, Relevance and Hypotheses
Small arms are those weapons than can be carried by an individual for personal use, and light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a crew (Wezeman, 2003a: 1). Their availability is generally considered as a major factor that influences armed violence and abuse of human rights. West African countries suffer enormously from insecurity generated by the proliferation and misuse of small arms in wrong hands. So the natural question is whether higher levels of small arms acquisition cause higher level of insecurity in Nigeria.
Today, the debate over small arms is receiving growing attention from researchers, policymakers, NGOs and the Civil Society. The reason is that this type of weaponry is perceived as an important factor of the outbreak and continuation of internal conflicts and tensions in Sub-Saharan African countries (Wezeman, 2003b:1). Nigeria is the most populous country (1) with the strongest economy (2) compared to the fifteen member States of ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States). However the country is an example of the paradox of greatness and insecurity. Nigeria is the central point of the regional drug trafficking, crimes of any kind and a big market of small arms. Frequently the media report the activities of armed groups. So the country is representative of the security dilemma in the region.
The study adds to contribute to the awareness of the security issue in the country as well as the small arms proliferation problem in the entire region. Two hypotheses can be drawn from these patterns:

H1: A State or a country that increases the military and security expenditure is more likely to experience higher level of political instability.
H2: A country that acquires higher quantity of small arms and light weapons is more likely to suffer from higher levels of armed violence and abuse of human rights.
Scientific publications, reports and surveys are devoted to the small arms proliferation and security issues in Sub-Saharan African countries and in Nigeria in particular.
Section 2: Review of Relevant Literature and Issues
(Florquin & Bernard: 2006), the study asserts that the proliferation of small arms fuelled violence among communities for the control over distribution of the benefits from oil in Nigeria. This study is a quantitative analysis on armed violence that covers the entire ECOWAS region, relying on interviews, press reports and academic research.
(Karp: 1994), the article outlines the origins and the characteristics of the covert transfers which emerged in the 1980s. This study from a political science expert and based on the large literature on statistics and officials, systemic processes and cabinet decisions, asserts that the "black markets" (Karp, 1994a: 178) are the reaction to international embargoes, and that the "gray markets" (Karp, 1994b: 187) serve diplomatic change.
(Blanton: 1999) and (Wang: 1998), both articles address the human rights issue and the proliferation of small arms and the political instability in Sub-Saharan African countries. They reflect event-count analysis with data collected for more than 30 years on a time-span of two

decades (1960-1980). The findings suggest that the flow of small arms contribute to repression and the institutionalization of "coups d'États" (3). But the difficulty encountered is how to measure the different types of "coups", either they have been successful, plotted or failed.
(Hazen & Jonas: 2007), the study attributes the explanation of violence in Nigeria to politics and elections, the shift to democratic governance, oil, ethnicity and religion (Hazen & Jonas, 2007a: 6). The struggle for resources has led to broad sense of insecurity and the pursuit of self-help strategies across the country (Hazen & Jonas, 2007b: 6-7). The study is a quantitative and a qualitative analysis of armed violence in Nigeria relying on a numerous interviews conducted among the foreign diplomatic corps, international organizations, individuals and NGOs.
(Klare: 1996), this is an exploratory study. Expert in arms control, the author establishes a causal relationship between the growing flows of small arms deriving from the traditional big suppliers the United States and the former Soviet Union. The study also points out the competitive practices of the Cold War (Klare, 1996: 857), and adds that small arms trade will continue to flourish in the "black markets". The article relies on a pooled times-series research design. It is an analysis of longitudinal and spatial variations in the arms trade. But the article lacks of a deep assessment on the clandestine transfers of small arms.
Although more information is available today than in the past, the lack of reliable data on small arms transfers is a major problem for public research and discussion on how to address the issue of arms transfers to conflict areas. Some major small arms exporters, such as China and Russia do not regularly reports statistics in the weapons and ammunition category. When

they do, the reported values to the database are too low to be credible (wezeman, 2003b: 11). The second weakness of these publications is that very little is known about military budgeting in African countries and Nigeria is not an exception. So the difficulties on conducting research on military spending and acquisition are compounded in Africa by institutional, cultural and resource scarcity factors (Kwabena: 2002).
Section 3: Operationalization of Variables and Identification of Measures
The estimated total value of authorized global trade in small arms is USD 4 billion a year, and more than USD 27 million of small arms are imported by African countries each year(4). Of the World`s seven largest exporters of small arms, the United States, Italy, Belgium, Germany, Russia, Brazil and China and the flows of these weapons to recipients are growing quantitatively.
In Nigeria, military and security spending is increasing. In addition to its international task to contribute to peacekeeping mission within the ECOWAS, Nigeria Military has obviously the duty to protect citizens. Domestically the Army is facing security problems. But due to the growing internal tensions, both the Military and the Police handle these problems together, and acknowledge that they are dealing with well-armed rebels, militias and sects. Thus the need to procure weapons to counter these armed groups (5) is a priority.
In order to ensure a well-equipped Army and Police, the Nigeria government increased significantly the Military and Police expenditures. The government also has increased funding

for the Defense Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) (6). The DICON is the only private facility authorized to supply arms and ammunition to the Military and Police. The Corporation is receiving assistance from South African and Chinese companies. The government aimed at making the country self-sufficient in weapons and ammunition production.
Sub-Saharan African countries' military budget data are notoriously opaque, incomplete and deceptive (Smaldone: 1999a). This is not more likely to change any time soon. Since 1981, there has been a global Military expenditure reporting mechanism, the "United Nations Instrument for Reporting Military Expenditures". According to this initiative, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) accounted for most of the Military spending growth in the late nineties(Smaldone: 1999b). Nigeria military expenditures have increased from 15,350 NGN million (7) in 1996 to 122,314 NGN in 2007 (SIPRI: 2007a). Regarding the Police, its primary duty is to reinforce law and maintain order. But the concern is its capacity to carry out its duties. The Police Force has grown since the return of democracy in 1999, from 160,000 to over 300, 000 officers in 2007(Hanzen & Jonas, 2007a: 31). The Nigeria government has taken steps to increase the resources available to the Police. The 2007 budget provides for USD 2.38 million for the procurement of arms and ammunition (Hanzen & Jonas, 2007b: 33).
Nigeria government has increased the Military and the Police spending in an attempt to ensure the capacity of those Forces to protect its boundaries, and to combat the growing criminality. So, in addition to legal transfers, illicit traffic and local production of small arms
have led to a surplus of this type of weapons in the country.

While small arms and their components are produced in a number of African countries (8), the scale of this production is small, both in comparison with the quantity of weapons produced in the rest of the World and with the number of small arms used in Africa.
A major conceptual problem in current intergovernmental debate on small arms remains the distinction between legal and illicit trade. The guidelines for international arms transfers agreed in 1991 by the UN General Assembly include the following definition of illicit arms trafficking:
"[…] that international trade in conventional arms which is contrary to the
laws of States and/or international law" (O'Grady: 1999a).
There are a numerous security agencies that operate in Nigeria. Apart from the primary agencies authorized to carry arms such as the Armed Forces, intelligence agencies, the Police, there other agencies allowed to do so. The number of official small arms is likely to increase. The most commonly used weapons in Africa's civil wars are the Kalashnikov assault rifles. One to three million small arms is in circulation in Nigeria (Small Arms Survey: 2003).
In addition to legal transfers of small arms, the country is provided an important surplus of this type of weapons from illicit external or internal transactions. The local acquisitions are generated by the craft production (Hanzen & Jonas, 2007c: 40). Massive small surplus were also created when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Transfers of surplus weapons to Africa from Eastern Europe have caused social havoc in the continent, as these transfers fan the flames of pre-existing external and internal conflicts (O`Grady: 1999b). European's surplus weapons are sold at below cost in Africa. The

abundance and low prices of weapons create opportunities to sell goods locally on the thriving black-markets, thus making these weapons accessible to an even range of people to use in violent repression, conflict, or criminal activity.
Here, "arms brokers" (9) play an important role in the illicit arms trade, and their expertise is in high demand. In Sub-Saharan African countries 59.2% of the small arms are owned privately, 37.8% by the government and Armed Forces, 2.8% by the Police and 0.25% by armed opposition groups (Hillier & Wood, 2003: 20).
The craft production also helps to increase quantitatively the small arms supplies in the country, and contributes to their proliferation. Craft weapons are widely in Nigeria. The reason is they are inexpensive and easy to acquire. They include revolvers and shotguns used for hunting, community policing and self-defense. The main purchasers are hunters, businessmen, politicians, elites and vigilante groups, and there are numerous craft production markets throughout the country such as Kaduna, Katsina, Awka and Calabar. Craft production is legal only when the craftsman is licensed by the government, and thereby authorized to produce firearms. But many do so without any permission.
The accumulation of such small arms may contribute to destabilizing internal situations leading either to the exacerbation of crime and urban violence, or to a blurring of the distinction between crime and warfare (Small Arms and Light Weapons: 2008). Measuring the illegal trafficking of small arms is very difficult. Reliable data is unavailable because of the nature of the nature of the transfers and the poor record keeping. There is no existing official

figure for the illicit trade. Only second-hands reports are supported by interviews individuals who had little evidence to do so.
Ammunition is spent quickly during a conflict and needs to be resupplied constantly. In general, ascertaining the origins of ammunition used in Sub-Saharan African countries is not easy. Spain is the biggest supplier of ammunition in those countries (Iansa & Oxfam, 2007a: 1). The UN COMTRADE database shows that of imports of ammunition to African countries worth USD 109.2 million, 98% came from outside the continent(Iansa & Oxfam, 2009b: 1). Very little, if any military ammunition is produced in West Africa, in East Africa however, researchers report finding Kenya-Uganda, and Sudanese-manufactured ammunition in the hands of non-State armed groups in several countries. Although we cannot quantify precisely the amount of ammunition manufactured in Africa and in Nigeria in particular that contributes to conflicts and armed violence, we do know that the vast majority of ammunition comes from outside Africa.
Put all together, the increase of military and security spending as well as the easy availability of arms tends to increase the incidence of armed violence and insecurity in Nigeria.
The insecurity in Nigeria is characterized by both political instability over the years with frequent military coups and armed violence. Violence can be defined as the "intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that results in injury, death, psychological, maldevelopment or deprivation" (World Health Organization: 2002). Thus we examine the actual carrying out of

violent acts, the driving forces behind these episodes of violence in Nigeria, and the tools used in committing acts of violence.
Small arms and light weapons are the strictly military arms contributing to the destabilization in ECOWAS countries.
During the past few decades and after the acquisition of independence from the possession of arms has enhanced the Military's position vis-à- vis of civilian institutions in society. The institutionalization of the "coups d' État" has become an integral part of the African political process (Wang, 1998a: 659). The evidence of regime instability characterized by "coups d'État" in Nigeria illustrates the period from 1963 to 1993. Eight coup events occurred in the country from 1981 to 1990(SIPRI, 2007b).In the 1960s, many Sub-Saharan African countries like Nigeria suffered from "coups d'État". Most of them had generated military dictatorship and the denial of democracy. Even though democracy is not something new to the country, military regimes had ruled Nigeria for most its post-colonial period.
Violence was common during military rule, and the seeds of various forms of armed violence were planted during that period.
Violence in Nigeria has often been described as fight over religion or over oil (Ginifer & Olawade, 2005a). But the typology of armed violence in the country includes inter and intra-communal violence, ethnic militia, armed criminality, State armed and State-sponsored violence (Ginifer & Olawade, 2005b). The preliminary data gathered show the increase of

violence in the country. 234 incidents of armed violence have been identified during April 2007 elections only (Ginifer & Olawade, 2005c). These incidents occurred in 27 of the 36 States of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory (Hanzen & Jonas, 2007d: 52). Generally, incidents of armed violence appeared more concentrated in Lagos State and in the Delta States of Rivers. These incidents were primarily criminal in nature, except in the Delta States where they were a mixture of criminal and oil- related violence. International reporting asserted that violent crime was the most common incident, followed by political and election and oil-related violence.
According to a national survey conducted by the CLEEN Foundation, assault and grievous harm and wounding are the most common violent incidents nationwide. Murder and manslaughter are far less common. The overall level of violence in Nigeria has increased over the past several years. This finding gives support to the popular belief that violence escalated since the return to democracy in the country in 1999. Also, kidnapping, a different type of violence has been going since the early 1990s (Chatham House: 2006). Hostages have been taken for two reasons: political bargaining and economic gains. Armed groups always use the tactic of kidnaping of international workers to raise international attention regarding the plight of those living in the Delta, the environmental damage caused by oil, and the demand for more local ownership of the extraction of natural resources (Hanzen & Jonas, 2007e: 69).
Although there are regional differences in the prevalence and use of small arms in Nigeria, there is far less variance in the types of people who possess and use them. Small arms appear to be more concentrated in the hands of armed groups, criminal gangs and elites. Data taken

From the Small Arms Survey Study of Press Reports suggests that most civilians are unarmed, and that civilian possession is not widespread. According to the study, in cases of reported violence, civilians rarely responded as armed actors. Instead, small arms appear to be held by select groups. In addition to the Military and the Police, politicians, armed groups, and political thugs are the most commonly cited possessors of these weapons.
The pattern of victimization in Nigeria matches more closely patterns seen in countries at war than those at peace. The Small Arms Survey Study of Press Reports between November 2006 and February 2007 reported that 212 incidents of armed violence. In these incidents, 413 people were killed. According to the same report, these are only events captured by the international and national press. Most of the effects of armed violence during this period were suffered by unarmed civilians, while the armed perpetrators suffered the fewest negative effects. Unarmed civilians suffered 53% of all effects according to the study. Crime rates have been exacerbated by the high proliferation of small arms throughout the country (Human Rights Watch: 1999).
The economic costs of armed violence represent resources lost to Nigerian society that could have been invested in projects that benefit to the economy and population. Direct costs arise from violence involve actual expenditure. Indirect costs represent lost resources and opportunities. In the Niger Delta for example, oil has become a contributor of violence due to a permanent sabotage perpetrated by armed groups in the region.


Section 4: Data Gathering and Analytical Techniques
To test our hypotheses, we need to assess the impact of our independent variable on the Small Arms Acquisition by the Nigeria government over time, from the 1970s to the 1990s through imports, and by individuals and armed groups through local production. The analysis of our dependent variable on Insecurity in Nigeria is extended on the same period regarding the coups events that design the sum of successful coups, failed and coups plots, as well as the crime statistics. We use a causal model sustained by a decade long intervals which seems to be suitable in this context, because the increase of military spending and the high levels of small arms surplus cause the increase of violence over the years. Our data set is collected from numerous sources including media reports such as BBC and Reuters News articles, SIPRI Year Book(1990-2000), listing the types of regimes and the number of coups events that occurred in Nigeria, as well as statistics on religious and ethnic incidents and clashes that took place throughout the country since 1999. The Small Arms Survey (2007) we use compiles statistics on the number of security agencies operating in the country, statistics on military expenditures and on craft production. National media sources such as Ebo (2006) displays kidnapping operations in the Niger Delta.
Section 5: Data Presentation and Analysis
Table 1 shows the results of the causal model analysis on the increase of the military spending and the political instability in the country. It shows the increase of the military influence on the government through the frequency of "coups d'État". The government

expenditures suggest an ongoing attempt over the past decades to infuse additional funding into the Military. Eight coups events occurred in the country from 1966 to 1993. The "coups d`État" are quite common in African politics. It is likely that expenditures on small arms imports may directly or indirectly affect the likehood of coups in Nigeria. In addition, small arms transfers have strengthened the political centrality of the Military (Thomas H.: 1984) in the country during that period. The increase of arms acquisition not only increases firepower of the Military, but also initiates a chain of events that cumulates in strengthening the Armed Forces. Table 1 also shows seven military governments during the same period. Consequently, military forces are likely to feel that they not only have the ability to manage the government, but could do a better job than the civilian government. Thus the centrality of the Military is an overwhelming pattern in Nigeria politics. Military centrality theory emphasizes on the political position of the Armed Forces vs.-à-vs. of civilian institutions. The basic argument is that civilian leaders would have little or no control over the Military if the Military is dominant in the society. Therefore, the "coups d` État" would be easily used by military leaders as tools against civilian governments.
The main finding is that shipments and the increase of military spending have had long-term direct effects on the occurrence of political instability and coups in Nigeria.
Weapons in too many hands risk increasing violence. Once in wrong hands they pose an even greater risk that they will be used to also abuse human rights. So the availability of small arms itself is one important factor in determining the level of violence. As expected, our

dependent variable is statistically significant in this causal model. Tables 2 and 3 are very illustrative on religious and ethnic incidents as well as their impact. Although violent conflicts have often been depicted as clash between the North and the South, the reality also shows that there are tensions within and between the regions. Violent clashes have taken place as a result of ethnic and religious tensions, communal competition over grazing and farming lands and tensions over the distinction between indigenes and sellers. The imposition of "Sharia" by some States in contravention of the national convention led to rioting by Christians in the North. Also the variable "Armed violence" is statically significant. Table 3 is illustrative of the types of crimes that occurred frequently as well as their level over the past several years.

Table 1. Nigeria military spending in (NGN, $USD), types of regimes
and frequency of "coups d'État", 1963-2010.

Years Value of military expenditures NGN & USD millions Name of president Type of government Departure from government Arms transfers as % of military spending
1963-1966 - Nnamdi Azikiwe civilian coup -
1966 - Johnson A. Ironsi Military Coup (killed) -
1975-1976 436USD Murtala Muhammed Military Attempted coup
(killed) -
1976-1979 - Olusegun
Obasanjo Military election 0.03
1979-1983 385USD Shehu Shagari civilian Fraudulent election considered as a coup 0.84
1984-1985 - Muhammadu Buhari Military coup 0.84
1985-1993

___________
1993

___________
1998
___________
1999

___________
2005

___________
2007

___________
2010 674USD

___________
678USD

___________
-
___________
45,400 NGN

___________
63,472NGN

___________
122,314NGN

___________
- Ibrahima Babanguida
___________
Ernest Shonekan
___________
Sani Abacha
___________
Abdulsolami Abubakar
___________
Olesugun Obasanjo
___________
Umary Yaradua
___________
Goodluck J. Military

___________
Civilian

___________
Military
___________
Military

___________
Military

___________
Civilian

___________
civilian forced to step down
___________
coup

___________
deceased
___________
election

___________
election

___________
election

___________
succession 0.84

___________
-

___________
-
___________
-

___________
-

___________
-

___________
-
Source: SIPRI Year Book 1990-2000.

Table 2. Illustrative incidents of religious and ethnic violence, 1999-2006

Date Event Impact
May 1999

November 1999

2000 clashes between ethnic Ijaws & Itsekiris in Niger Delta
lashes between Yoruba & Hausa in Lagos
protests against imposition of Sharia across the North Up to 200 killed


100+ killed

Thousands killed
September 2001

October 2001 Riots between Christians & Muslims in Joss Plateau
Clashes in Kano between Christians & Muslims after protests against US bombing of Afghanistan 915+ killed




200+ killed
February 2002

November 2002 Clashes between ethnic Hausa & Yoruba in Lagos
Riots in Kaduna over Miss World Pageant 100+ killed, 430 wounded


215+ killed
August 2003 Ethnic clashes in Warri over oil rights & political power 100+ killed, 1,000+ injured
May 2004 Clashes between Christians and Muslims in Plateau. Government declares state of emergency 600+ killed
February 2006 Riots and protests across northern Nigeria and in Southern city of Onitsha over the Danish publication of cartoons of the prophet Mahomet 100+ killed
March 2006 Ethnic clashes over land & property rights in the South-East 8 killed
Source: based on Reuters AlterNet (2007), BBC (2004) and cited in the Small Survey (2007).

Table 3. Nigeria crime statistics 1999-2006
Type 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Murder 1,645 1,255 2,120 2,117 2,136 2,550 2,074 2000
Manslaughter 14 101 14 13 233 23 11 2
Attempted murder 220 76 253 267 6 315 283 389
Suicide 323 146 241 152 191 131 128 199
Attempted suicide 30 41 27 29 38 19 20 51
Grievous harm & wounding 15,931 9,756 15,241 17,580 17,666 18,733 22,858 26,434
Assault 33,881 17,909 37,531 29,329 29,125 29,863 33,991 32,838
Source: CLEEN Foundation (2007).
Section 6: Summary and conclusions
The present study adds to our understanding of the role small arms acquisition plays in the political instability and insecurity in Nigeria. Our findings confirm that the increase of military and security expenditures as well as the small arms surplus has caused high levels of political instability and armed violence in the country. This is characterized by religious and ethnic deadly clashes and permanent criminal activities of numerous armed groups and military coups.
Conclusions that could be drawn from this study are:
- First: Nigeria faces the issue of small arms proliferation and misuse. This problem results from a combination of large quantities of arms in circulation, and a number of incentives for individuals and groups to resort to violence (Small Arms Survey, 2007a: 19).
- Second: Armed violence remains a common and a recurrent problem in Nigeria. The whole situation is compounded by the inadequacy of the security forces and the inability of the government to track and control the process that leads from licensing to ownership of an arm. Thus a key element of addressing insecurity and armed violence is a comprehensive security sector reform (Small Arms Survey, 2007b: 19).

ENDNOTES
1. The population of the country is estimated over 150 million in 2007 by the World Bank.
2. Recent estimation of the IMF suggests the oil revenues of Nigeria are amounted USD 50 billion in 2005.
3. Military involvement in the African political process with the purpose of removing the civil government in place, and consequently install military rule and dictatorship.
4. Estimation of the Institute of International Studies of 2006.
5. Major armed groups and more than a hundred sects are operating in the country according to the Small Armed Survey of 2004.
6. In 2006 the Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo authorized funding USD 8 million for the DICON according to the Small Arms Survey report of 2006.
7. Nigeria Naira million.
8. Twenty-two companies in South Africa, seven in Egypt and one in Nigeria produce small arms and their components.
9. According to the UN definition, a "broker" is any person who acts as an agent for others in negotiating or arranging contracts, purchases or sales of defense articles.


REFERENCES


1. Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 1999. "Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries". Journal of Peace Research, 36: 233-244.

2. Chatham House. 2006. "Oil and Elections: Prospects for the Resolution for the Resolution of Oil Conflict in the Delta and Potential Impacts on the 2007 Elections".
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/africa/papers/view/-/id/355 (May 2, 2006).

3. Florquin, Nicolas, Eric G. Berman. 2006. Armés mais désœuvrés : Groupes armés, armes légères et sécurité humaine dans la région de la CEDEAO. Bruxelles : GRIP.

4. Ginifer, Jeremy, Ismail Olawade. 2005. Armed Violence and Poverty in Nigeria. Bradford: University of Bradford.

5. Hanzen, Jennifer, Jonas Horner. 2007. "Small Arms, Armed Violence and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Delta Niger in Perspective ". Occasional Paper20, Geneva: GIIS.

6. Hillier, Debbie, Brian Wood. 2003. Shattered Lives: The Case for Though InternationalArms Control. London: Amnesty International & Oxfam International.

7. Human Rights Watch. 1999. "Nigeria: The Destruction of Odi and Rape in Choba".
http://www.hrw.org/press/1999/dec/nibg1299.htm(January 20, 1999).

8. Iansa & Oxfam. 2007. "Africa`s Mission Billions: International Arms Flows and the Cost of Conflict", Briefing Paper.

9. Thomas, H. Johnson, Pat McGowan. 1984. "Explaining African Military Coups d` État: 1960-1982". The American Political Journal, 78: 622-640.

10. Karp, Aaron. 1994. "The Rise of Black and Gray Markets". Annals of American Academy of Political Science, 535: 175-189.

11. Klare, T. Michael. 1996. "The Arms Trade in the 1990s: Changing Patterns, Rising Dangers". Third Quarterly, 17: 857-874.

12. Kwabena, Gyimah-Brempong. 2002. "Researching Military Expenditures in Africa: Findings and Lessons for Researches". Workshop Paper.

13. O`Grady, Margaret E. 1999. "Small Arms and Africa". http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/countries/africa-0999.php (April 3, 1999).

14. Smaldone, Joseph P. 1999. "Does Military Spending Matter? Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-1999". http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2004_04_06/smaldone_mil... (March 15, 2004).

15. "Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Challenge to the Churches". http://www.wcc-coe.org/what/international/background.html (December 2, 2008).

16. Small Arms Survey. 2003. "Development Denied". http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/sas/publications/yearb2003.html (August 23, 2003).

17. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. "SIPRI Military Expenditure database". http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_database1.html(April 12, 2007).

18. Wang, TY. 1998. "Arms Transfers and Coups d` État: A Study on Sub-Saharan Africa".
Journal of Peace Research, 35: 659-675.
19. Wezeman, Pieter. 2003. "Conflicts and Transfers of Small Arms". Solna: SIPRI.

20. World Health Organization. 2002. "World Report on Violence and Health". http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2002/9241545615.pdf (July 3, 2002).

Ambivalence de la place de l'Allemagne en Europe au 20e siècle

Depuis un siècle, il existe une "question allemande" qui consiste à s'interroger sur la place de l'Allemagne en Europe ; autrement dit tout le complexe qui a trait à l'organisation territoriale et nationale, à la constitution socio-politique de l' espace centre européen habité par les Allemands, ainsi qu'à la position de ceux-ci sur l'échiquier international.
Vue de l'extérieur, l'Allemagne, c.-à-d. un Etat, une nation et une culture, vit au milieu des incertitudes et des doutes. Aussi sa place s'illustre-t-elle par bien des contradictions, voire des équivoques qui expliquent la complexité, ainsi que l'ambiguïté des relations avec ses pairs européens tant de l'Ouest que de l' Est. En quoi la place de l'Allemagne est-elle ambivalente en Europe au 20e siècle ? Une approche chronologique de la question nous amène à nous étendre sur trois principales périodes : 1890-1918, 1919-1945, 1945-1999.

La fin du 19e siècle est marquée par la recherche consacrée à la mondialisation et cet élan s'est renforcé au cours du 20e siècle. L'Allemagne impériale (1890-1918), sous l'égide de Guillaume II, s'est insérée dans le système des relations internationales de façon ambivalente et ambiguë. Dans ce que certains appellent "première mondialisation", l'Allemagne par sa fascination pour l'ouverture sur un monde immense s'exprimant par la "Weltpolitik", et son expansion économique qualifiée de "miracle économique", a participé de manière significative à cette première mondialisation. Cependant, une "place à part" lui aurait été imposée par les autres nations européennes qui ont voulu l'exclure des conquêtes coloniales, et son absence est constatée depuis les découvertes. Aussi, revendique-t-elle sa "place au soleil", autrement dit dans le " rush" colonial.
Dans la période de l'entre-deux guerres (1919-1945), l' ambiguïté de la place de l'Allemagne en Europe s'illustre sur les plans diplomatique et politique.
Au plan diplomatique, le renouement des relations et la restauration de la parité diplomatiques sont à l'ordre du jour en 1919 et à partir de 1945. Même si l'Allemagne a été réadmise tant bien que mal dans la communauté diplomatique, le mode de distanciation adoptée par les vainqueurs des deux guerres ne lui garantit pas pour autant une réadmission internationale. De même à travers la politique à deux vitesses de Gustav Stressmann l'ex-ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand, l' Allemagne est perçue comme un pays ennemi et un pays conciliant, cherchant simultanément un rapprochement grâce aux accords de Locarno du 16 octobre 1925 et la restauration de sa puissance.
Au plan politique, les leaders conservateurs hongrois apprécient à sa juste valeur la forte influence allemande sur la destinée de leur pays ; mais la méfiance vient des populations qui rendent plutôt les Allemands responsables de la misère du pays. L'attirance incontrôlée de la Hongrie vers l'Allemagne a pesé d'un poids indéniable dans les relations franco-hongroises, tant et si bien que reconnaissant les meilleurs résultats allemands dans le contexte général de l'"Ostpolitik", la France s'est résignée à cette contradiction qui veut que l'avenir de l'Europe dépende en grande partie de sa coopération avec son ennemie d' hier. La signature du traité de protection germano-slovaque du 23 mars 1939 qui renforçait l'orientation pro-allemande de la Slovaquie vient dissiper la peur des Slovaques du "germanisme". En effet, redoutant le "Reich" hier, la Slovaquie contre toute attente en devient plutôt une complice.
Pour ce qui est des relations avec l'URSS, il faut reconnaître un grand malaise et même une profonde méfiance vis-à-vis de l' Allemagne, compte tenu de l'ampleur des dommages de la guerre dont elle a souffert. Bien que la haine des Allemands ait aussi contribué à la chute du régime tsariste en 1917, la "révolution rouge" de Lénine semble compter sur le nécessaire succès de la révolution allemande, d'où les accords de Rapallo du 16 avril 1922. Mais il est lieu de rappeler que les rapports germano-soviétiques dans la période de l'entre-deux guerres ne manquent pas d'autres ambiguïtés. En effet la menace allemande avec la Deuxième guerre mondiale, devient plutôt une obsession et un véritable instrument de cohésion tant à l'extérieur de l' URSS qu'à l'égard de ses alliés Est-européens.
En dépit des ruptures et des discontinuités de l'histoire allemande, c'est la même question qui a été reformulée entre 1945 et 1999 ; les raisons en sont la division de l'Allemagne en deux Etats (RFA et RDA) dans l'immédiat de l'après-guerre, et son unification en 1990.
L'interaction et l'amalgame si étroites entre les intérêts européens et allemands amènent certains à affirmer que "la question allemande est à toutes les époques une question européenne, et la question européenne est à toutes les époques la question allemande". En réalité, il est impossible de déterminer avec exactitude où commencent les accents européens et où finissent les accents allemands et vice versa. De cette contradiction se dégage une réalité historique qui veut qu'on pense Europe et Allemagne en même temps et ensemble.
En raison de son potentiel économique et de la réalisation de son unification, l'Allemagne ne peut laisser indifférent. Elle occupe une position centrale dans la perspective d'une grande Europe. La masse des Allemands et des germanophobes font d' elle le premier ensemble culturel européen, et semble par conséquent être la clé de l'équilibre européen en même temps une charge explosive. Toutefois elle est incapable de maintenir un équilibre de forces autour d'elle. L'entité allemande est en panne d'identité, car ce que recouvre le vocable "Allemagne" a fait l'objet de controverse bien avant 1945. Une réflexion sur l'identité des Allemands a fait constater que l'état d` âme allemand est plein d`incertitudes, vide d'une conscience politique et d'un manque d'idéal politique servant de référence.

Comme on le voit, la place de l'Allemagne en Europe au 20e siècle s'illustre par des contradictions qui ont conditionné ses relations avec les autres pays européens. En même temps, cette Allemagne est en butte à une crise identitaire. Aujourd'hui unie et plus grande elle a un nouveau problème allemand : dans quelle continuité va-t-elle inscrire son action ? Quel rôle va-t-elle vouloir jouer en Europe ? L'Allemagne a besoin de l' Europe et l'Europe a besoin de l'Allemagne. Tant que l' Allemagne restera dans la situation où elle est actuellement, l' Europe aura mal à l'Allemagne et ne parviendra pas à retrouver son équilibre.

Sources

Allain, J.C., "Un regard de diplomates français sur l' Allemagne des immédiats après-guerres (1919-1945)", Actes de colloque, 2000.

Fritsch-Bournazel, Renata, L'Allemagne un enjeu pour l'Europe, Editions Complexe, Bruxelles, 1987, 252 pages.

Fritsch-Bournazel, Renata, "La Russie et l'Allemagne : entre obsession et instrumentalisation", Actes de colloque, 2000.

Fritsch-Bournazel, Renata, L'Allemagne unie dans la nouvelle Europe, Editions Complexe, Paris, 1991, 375 pages.

Martens, Stephan, L'Allemagne la nouvelle puissance européenne, PUF/IRIS, Paris, 2002.

Miard-Delacroix, H., "L'Allemagne impériale entre'place au soleil' et'place à part', in Relations internationales, 2005.

Understanding the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989

When the Soviet government engaged its troops in a long lasting military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, one could not expect the second Superpower at that time to decide to withdraw promptly due to the persistence of the Cold War atmosphere. Superpowers usually take significant foreign policy actions that are felt globally. They are scrutinized by political analysts and scholars, because those actions send a specific message to the World.
The Soviet military venture in Afghanistan was justified by "tied friendship, good-neighborliness (1), "fraternal aid" (2) and the absolute necessity to bring stability to the Afghan government. This government was praised by the USSR to have brought the country to the socialist sphere of influence (3). Others argue that the Soviet military intervention derived from the Brezhnev Doctrine (4).
Concerning the Soviet withdrawal, the natural question is in what perspectives can one assess this foreign policy action? In other words what could have commended the Soviet pull-back from Afghanistan?
After an overview of the Soviet invasion the question will be analyzed in three different perspectives.
First: the implication of Gorbachev's "New-Thinking" Doctrine (5). This is a set of
1. Arundhati, R. (1987). The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Causes, Consequences and India's Response. New-Delhi: Associated Publishing House, pp. 18-19.
2. Magnus, R. H. (1985). Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options, and Policies. New Brunswick, New-Jersey: Transaction Books, p. 13.
3. Malley, W. (2002). The Afghan Wars. New-York: Palgrave McMillan, p.35.
4. A concise explanation of the Brezhnev Doctrine will be given in the next pages.
5. The "New-Thinking" Doctrine is to be explained extensively in the next pages.
1
of reforms implementing domestic imperatives in order to improve the deteriorating economic, political and socio-cultural situation in the USSR. This catastrophic environment urged for the building of an attractive economy and other reforms that could lead to change course in foreign policy.
Second: the balance of interests along with the military reforms. The pulling back of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan was seen by Mikhail Gorbachev more beneficial than the pursue of the balance of power. He wanted to pull back from costly and failing ventures, to cut losses and attempt to achieve political settlement, détente and improve external relations with the West.
Third: the Afghan nationalism and the internal Soviet opposition to war also have increasingly determined the withdrawal.
Afghanistan has known a succession of regimes and governments from the 1970s to the 1980s. This naturally led to the communist rule in the country, and subsequently to the emergence and the growth of the Afghan anti-communist Alliance. Kabul government and Moscow authorities signed a friendship treaty in 1978(6). The crisis between the new pro-Marxist Kabul government and the anti-communist Alliance emerged so quickly that in 1979 there were almost 100,000 Soviet troops in the Afghan border (7). In addition to friendship, the Brezhnev doctrine enunciated in 1968 seems to be the most determining factor for the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Its aim was direct "Soviet paternal
protection" (8) and assistance to regimes and government that have accepted the
6. Rogers, T. (1992). The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology. Wesport: Greenwoods Press, p. 18.
7. ibid.
8. Miller, R. (1989). Afghanistan and Soviet Alliances. In Saikal and Malley, W. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. New-York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, p.103.

2

socialist ideology and became part of the Soviet-Communists (9). The Brezhnev Doctrine also puts together ideology and national security as determinants of Soviet foreign policy (10). The overall assessment of the Brezhnev Doctrine indicates that it encompasses two components: the defense of socialist revolutions within the general Soviet sphere of influence, and Afghanistan's geographical proximity relevant to the Soviet interests (11).
Beyond the implementation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, domestic factors led to the search of "defensible borders" (12). Ideology provided another important justification to the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in reference to the Leninist notions of "international duty" (13) and "civilizing mission" (14), and the potential spread of the Iranian Revolution as well. In the contrary of the Brezhnev Doctrine which promoted an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, Gorbachev`s "New-Thinking "philosophy emphasizes on the domestic imperatives and reforms that determined the withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Gorbachev Doctrine that determined the pull back of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is a "reformist philosophy" (15) and a macro-foreign policy with a set of propositions. The major themes of that philosophy rely on domestic efficiency and reforms and the balance of interests. It provides a different picture of the World and redefines the Soviet role in it, discusses the failure of Brezhnev's foreign policy, and enunciates new principles on internal relations, defensive sufficiency and
9. Miller, R. (1989), p. 103.
10. Gabriella, G. (1995). British and American Reponses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company, p.69.
11. Nye, J. (1999). Understanding International Conflicts. Don Mills, Ontario: Longman, p.150.
12. Magnus, R. H. (1985), p.14.
13. ibid.
14. ibid.
15. Ship, A. "Application of Doctrine: The Soviet-Afghan Conflict ", p.1.

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domestic motivations (16).
In the decade before 1985, the Soviet regime was facing big amount of problems especially the political and economic stagnation. From the outside World, the Soviet Union was seen as the second largest economy but deep within the system, this apparent strength was questioned. Tatiana Zaslavskaia (17) pointed out a growing inability of the Soviet economy to compete in an age of high technology (18). Goldman Marshall emphasizes the usefulness and the inability of the Central Planning System to react effectively (19). Western and Soviet economists agree on the six key problems(20) that plague the soviet economy; among them the constant shortages of consumer goods and good-quality food, the low quality of industrial goods needed for export markets, a serious diminution in Soviet technology vis-à-vis the rest of the World, an economic structure that is over centralized and extremely bureaucratic. The deteriorating Soviet economy influenced Gorbachev, who saw withdrawal from Afghanistan as crucial for a needed improvement in relations with the industrial World (21). The withdrawal and the improvement of the economy were critical in order to attract economic and trade concessions (22). The public debate generated by "glasnost" or the openness exposed the bad situation of the Soviet economy. This allowed Gorbachev to push for reforms. By late 1984, Mikhail Gorbachev joined
16. Holloway, D. (1989). America and the World 1988/89. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 3, 1989, from: http://www.foreignrs.org/19890201faessay5935/david.holloway/gorbachev-s-new-thinking.html.
17. A social Scientist at the Siberian Division of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, author of a long study detailing the weaknesses of the Soviet economy entitled: "The Voice of Reforms".
18. Zaslavskaia, T. (1989). The Voice of Reforms.
19. Goldman, M. I. (1992). Perestroika. Retrieved from: http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Perestroika.html.
20. Tarasulo, I. J. (1989). Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press. Wilmington: Scholarly resources Inc., p.67.
21. Ship, A. op.cit, p.10.
22. Rogers, T. (1992), p.51.

4
those who believed that the Soviet economic system could not continue without deep reforms, he concluded that "it was impossible to live that way" (23), and added that "we could not avoid paying attention to this extremely important area in the life of our society"(24).
Domestically, Gorbachev conducted his new policy under three programs commonly known as "perestroïka", "glasnost" and "democratization" in order words: economic reform, and openness. In reference to Abel Aganbegyan, Gorbachev`s Chief Economic Advisor, "the Russians were going over from an authoritarian to a democratic economy, an economy governed by the people, with substantial involvement of the masses in economic management" (25).
The "perestroïka" program is viewed as the Soviet economic and social reform policy of the late 1980s. Gorbachev defines it as "a priority development of the social sphere aimed at ever better satisfaction of the soviet people's requirements for good living, education and health care"(26). Among the most important economic reforms emphasis was on State enterprise and the foreign trade.
Concerning the reform on State enterprise, The Supreme Soviet passed the law on it in July 1987. The purpose was to allow State enterprises to set their own prices and wages. This step allowed ownership of business in the services, manufacturing and foreign trade sectors. This change happened for the first time since Lenin's New Economic policy (NEP). Gorbachev also issued orders to the party Committees to stop interfering in the economy. The restructuration of the "All-Union" industrial organizations started. These newly autonomous business organizations were
23. Goldman, M. I. (1992).
24. Gorbachev, M. (1999). On My Country and the World. New-York: Columbia University-Press, p. 85.
25. Coleman, F. (1996), p.228.
26. Kislansky, M. (2001). Sources of the West: Reading in Western Civilization. New-York: Longman, p.322. 5
encouraged to seek foreign investment.
The foreign trade reform virtually eliminated the monopoly of the Ministry of foreign trade on most trade operations. Ministries related to industrial and agricultural activities were permitted to conduct foreign trade only in sectors under their responsibilities. Regional and local organizations and individual State enterprises were permitted to conduct foreign trade. This change was an attempt to redress a major imperfection in the Soviet foreign trade regime namely, the lack of contact between Soviet users and suppliers and their foreign partners. The most significant of Gorbachev`s reforms in the economic sector was to allow foreigners to invest in the Soviet Union in the form of joint ventures with Soviet Ministries, State enterprises and cooperatives. While working on economic change, Gorbachev also sees the necessity to reform the political structures of the Soviet Union. It was a guarantee of a long term reform in the country.
Politically, the Soviet leader called from democratization. In this process, democratic elements were introduced in the system. Some examples illustrate our point of view such as the multicandidate elections and the reduction of the Communist Party control over the government apparatus. The second crucial element in Gorbachev`s political strategy is "glasnost" which allowed openness and free debates in the country. The merit of "glasnost" is the search of the truth. During an interview in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev was quoted as saying: I detest lies" (27). This openness gave new freedoms to the Soviet people, such as freedom of speech. The Soviet press could criticize senior communist officials and their foreign policy actions, example of the invasion of Afghanistan. Gorbachev`s goal in undertaking "glasnost" was to pressure conservatives of the Party who were against his policies of economic restructuring. His hope also was to earn the Soviet people support of his reform initiatives through debate and participation.
The assessment of the "glasnost" shows that it has the same purpose of
27. Coleman, F. (1996), p. 231.
6
democratization, and promotes the ideological and cultural reforms in the Soviet society. All the reforms we have explained above were to regain domestic efficiency. The Soviet society had domestic imperatives and priorities. Continuing to occupy Afghanistan was really a burden for the deteriorating Soviet economy; this is where the balance of interests is crucial.
The first remark that can be made is that the balance of interests goes along with the military reforms which are one component of the "New-Thinking" Doctrine. From 1988 through 1991, the issue of military reforms became frequent on the Soviet national agenda. The potential change in the Military was focused on the system of personnel recruitment. The major issue was to transform the soviet Army to a volunteer professional one (28). The proposal for restructuring the Army appeared in 1988(29). The first plan for military reform was presented by the Ministry of defense in June 1990, and consisted of the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe, their redeployment, troops reductions, cuts in strategic forces and resolution of social problems in the Armed Forces (30). Why were the military reforms necessary?
In 1980, the Soviet troops in Afghanistan were 100,000 (31), 775,000 in Eastern Europe (32). The Soviet casualties were estimated over 5,000 and the Soviet lost aircraft costing to $2.5 billion (33). Those losses were attributed to the logistic military assistance the resistance received from the United States. The major conclusions were that expansionism and the occupation of Afghanistan were disadvantageous and costly. So the costs of maintaining Soviet control over Eastern Europe coupled with those of Afghanistan were illustrative. In addition, Mikhail
28. Stavinkin, A. (1998). What Kind of Army Do We Need? In Moscow News, November, 1988, p. 6.
29. ibid.
30. Vitaly, V. S. (1995). The War in Chechnya: Implications for Military Reform and Creation of Mobile Forces. A paper for the annual conference on Russian defense decision-making, Monterey, California, p. 2- 4.
31. Rogers, T. (1992), p. 18.
32. Rogers, T. (1992), p. 9.
33. Rogers, T. (1992), p. 18.
7
Gorbachev had to weigh the advantages of the invasion of Afghanistan with improved relations wit the West, the United States in particular and with China. The reorientation of the Soviet priorities was necessary due to the deteriorating economy and the military expenditures.
International cooperation and good relations with the industrial World were also beneficial for the security. At this point, the balance of interests became more relevant for the Soviet government than the balance of power. In reference to Tom Rogers, "Guns gave way to butter" (34). In other words, the Soviet economy and domestic needs took over costly foreign ventures such as the invasion of Afghanistan. Mikhail Gorbachev knew very well that the benefits from international cooperation should be immediate once his country pulled out from Afghanistan.
Aside from a much needed summit with china, Western countries showed signs of good faith; a formal end to Western economic sanctions imposed on the USSR after the invasion of Afghanistan. Also, Western European capitals were seeking the possibility and ways to promote and reward a potential Soviet withdrawal. The United States and other countries were ready to lift controls on high-technology Soviet importations.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was also prompted by the tremendous advance in nuclear weaponry. This inhibited the Soviet Union from reducing its enormous commitment to military development. Tom Rogers argues that the USSR was now forced to embark to a "one-dimensional foreign policy" (35). The lesson from this is that" military strength does not necessarily yield political results" (36).
Gorbachev "New-Thinking" Doctrine which is seen as the most determinant factor
34. Rogers, T. (1992), p. 4.
35. Rogers, T. (1992), p. 9.
36. Rogers, T. (1992), p.4.
8
of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has two significant characteristics. In fact, this philosophy was "conceptual and ideational" (37). In other words it was not a program of practical policies.
It is true that "New-Thinkers" perceived strong common interests with Western countries, even wishing a solid cooperation with the so-called "civilized World". It also appeared that the New-Thinking vision of common security will serve as the basis for Soviet policy. Wallander concluded that Gorbachev`s philosophy met the geopolitical and national interests (38). Nevertheless, the "New-Thinking "Doctrine faced multiple obstacles. The initiators were intellectual, not foreign policy experts.
This allowed the challenge the Leninist view of the World, but undermined the ability of the USSR to face the problems of negotiating the division of the military assets. The country needed experts capable to design policies that would protect and balance the competing interests emerging from the Soviet new society and economy.
Another obstacle faced by the "New-Thinking" Doctrine emerged from the international System, which did not really cooperate with the Soviet new vision of common interests, and security through non military cooperation. Gorbachev "New-thinking" Doctrine had not addressed realism (39). It did not even address a view of international relations based on the primacy of power that assumes that "conflicts and struggle over power are endemic among States (40). Finally, the "New-Thinking" Doctrine faced a problem related to the relations between the United States and the USSR. Those relations were not going smoothly because of the Soviet ideology.
Afghan nationalism and Soviet domestic opposition to war had also influenced
37. Wallander, C.A. (2002). Lost and Found. In The Washington Quarterly, 25(1), the Center for Strategic & International Studies, p. 117-129.
38. Wallander, C. A. (2002), p. 3.
39. ibid.
40. Rogers, T. (1992), p. 30.
9
the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan.
The invasion of Afghanistan created resentment among Afghan people. This made the central government in Kabul unpopular and the Soviet troops as well and which faced a difficult reality. They were unable to penetrate the cultural links existing between the Afghan Army and the local system of clans, tribes and ethnic groups. The system naturally excluded the foreigners. The Soviet soldiers and the local government were both incapable to control the rural areas, and this was really a big challenge. Another difficulty faced by the Soviet troops was how to agree with the Afghan Military on war strategies along with the cultural lines (41). The Soviet politicians and officials did not have the wisdom to anticipate the critical importance of Islam in the Afghan society. As stated earlier, the Soviet government lacked of experts on Islam. Even in the academic institutions, there was a lack of experts on Islam. The Soviet leadership ignored a lot about the strength of religious beliefs among the Afghan populations. The Islamic factor in Afghanistan became a big concern for the Soviet government and Military which were seen as "foreign invaders and infidels" (42).
The opposition against the war in Afghanistan also came from inside the USSR. Protestations against the Afghan Army campaign were initiated by veterans. These protestations were tolerated by the Soviet government. They show the new ways for Moscow government to prepare the Soviet populations for a withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Increasingly, Afghan nationalism and Soviet domestic opposition to the Afghan war also determined the withdrawal.
41. Rogers, T. (1992), p.30.
42. Savrankaya, S. (2001). Afghanistan: Lessons from the War, the Soviet Experience, Afghanistan, Russian Documents and Memoirs, the September 11th Sourcebooks, vol. 2.
10
The overall assessment of the decision to pull out of Afghanistan shows that the implementation of the Gorbachev Doctrine, the balance of interests and the Afghan nationalism coupled with the Soviet domestic opposition to war have pushed the Soviets to withdraw. However, some critics have brought contrary arguments underlining the ineffectiveness of the Doctrine, showing their credible reasons for the withdrawal.
In reference to Ship Adams, those critics argued that the real motivations of the Soviet pull-out were first, the strength of the Afghan resistance, and second, the Soviet inability to achieve military success (43). But to what extent are these contrary argumentations credible?
If the Soviet troops were successful on the frontline, the government should not think about the withdrawal. The PDPA (People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan) whose leadership was handled by Prime Minister Hafizallah Amin and President Nur Mohammad Taraki was becoming stable, and this stability was seen as an important factor of the withdrawal. The anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan unable the Soviet troops to secure Kabul the capital of the country, because the resistance received substantial foreign assistance (44). The military situation in Afghanistan itself provoked the prominence of the Gorbachev Doctrine, and worked against the anti-withdrawal opinion. The inadequate preparation of the Soviet Army for the mission in Afghanistan, including the no anti-guerilla training weakened the Soviet troops. Moscow finally realized that there is no military solution to the conflict. What is also true is that Mikhail Gorbachev himself did not support the military intervention in
43. Ship, A. op. cit. p. 14.
44. In September 1986, the Afghan Resistance received radio-guided stinger missiles from the United States that inflicted heavy losses on Soviet aircraft. In addition, the US financial aid to the resistance was evaluated to $280 million per year.
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Afghanistan. He desired the withdrawal before his rise to power, and was looking for the "power-consolidation" (45) of his coalition which supported the withdrawal.

The critical decision to withdraw from Afghanistan has to be taken by the Soviet government while the country was on the way to embark to a determinant period of transition. The natural question is what are the Soviet foreign policy objectives? The assessments of the Soviet behavior in the global arena show that before 1989, the USSR was still a totalitarian State, ruled by the powerful Communist Party, whose aims were to expand Socialism in the World, and if possible to destroy Capitalism. From the late 1980s, the country smoothly embarks to the process of democratization. Thus, the foreign policy actions are taken in a pluralistic system and democratic environment.
Because of this, Mikhail Gorbachev had the audacity to recognize the failure of the Soviet economy that had certainly inspired the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. Observers have concluded that Gorbachev "New-Thinking" philosophy is a "rare combination of pragmatic realism" (46) in one hand, and a "creative policy making" (47) in the other hand. This combination implemented in Afghanistan has given substantial credit to its initiator in the World, and has led Russia to the pro-western integration.
45. Ship, A. op. cit p.12.
46. Allison, G.T. (1988). Testing Gorbachev. In Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations.
47. ibid.



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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS
Arundhati, R. (1987). The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Causes, Consequences and India's Response. New-Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 164 pages.

Brzezinski, Z. (1989). The Grand Failure: The Birth and the Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, New-York: Charles Schribner`s Sons, 278 pages.

Coleman, F. (1996). The Decline and Fall of the Soviet Empire. New-York: St Martin's Press, 459 pages.

Gabriella, G. (1995). British and American Responses to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Brookfield, Vermont: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 216 pages.

Gorbachev, M. (1999). On My Country and the World. New-York: Columbia University-Press, 300 pages.

Gorbachev, M. (1987). Perestroika. New-York: Harper Collins, 298 pages.

Magnus, R.H. (1985). Afghan Alternatives: Issues, Options and Policies. New Brunswick: Transaction books, 221 pages.

Malley, W. (2002). The Afghan Wars. New-York: Palgrave McMillan, 274 pages.

Nye, J. (1999). Understanding International Conflicts. Don Mills, Ontario: Longman,
210 pages.

Rogers, T. (1992). The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology. Westport: Greenwood Press, 238 pages.

Savrankaya, S. (2001). Afghanistan: Lessons from the War, the Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, Russian Documents and Memoirs. The September 11th Sourcebooks, Vol. 2.

Tarasulo, I. J. (1989). Gorbachev and Glasnost: Viewpoints from the Soviet Press.
Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 363 pages.

PAPERS AND ARTICLES

Allison, G. T. (1988). Testing Gorbachev. In Foreign Affairs, November 1988, Council on Foreign Relations.

Mendelson, S. E. (1998). Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Miller, R. (1989). Afghanistan and Soviet Alliances. In Saikhal and Malley, W. The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. New-York: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, p. 103.

Savinkin, A. (1988). What Kind of Army Do We Need? In Moscow News.

Ship, A. Application of Doctrine: The Soviet-Afghan Conflict. 20 pages.

Vitaly, V. S. (1995). The War in Chechnya: Implications for Military Reform and Creation of Mobile Forces. Monterey, California, p. 3-4.

Wallander, C.A. (2002). Lost and Found. In the Washington Quarterly, 25(1), the CSIS and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 117-129.

Zaslavskaia, T. (1989). The Voice of reform. p. 3- 4.

ELECTRONIC SOURCES

Goldman, M. I. (1992). Perestroïka. Retrieved from: http://www..econlib.org/library/Enc/Perestroïka.html

Holloway, D. (1989). America and the World: 1988/89. Retrieved November 3, 1989 from: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/9890201essay/david.holloway/gorbachev-s-new-thinking.html







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